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PROSPECTIVE SELF-DENIAL:
CAN CONSUMERS CONTRACT TODAY TO ACCEPT
HEALTH CARE RATIONING TOMORROW?
CLARK C. HAVIGHURSTt
Rationing is a common buzz word in the American health policy
debate, conjuring up visions of officious interference in private
choices and arbitrary limitations on the freedom of physicians to
prescribe for their patients. The sensitiveriess of the "R-word" is
significant because it illustrates the extraordinary difficulty of
ensuring that the nation's scarce resources are efficiently allocated
between health care and other uses. In our political and legal
culture, a powerful taboo inhibits any effort, private as well as
public, to economize in the provision of health care by withholding
any arguably beneficial service.
Eliminating cultural, practical, and legal obstacles to responsible
economizing in the purchasing and provision of personal health
care should be a primary objective of national health policy reform.
An unrecognized reason why the nation is feeling so impoverished
these days despite its immense wealth is that purchasers of health
care-individuals, employers, and even government itself-lack
proven and acceptable methods for ensuring that marginal dollars
spent on health services yield at least as much benefit as could be
gotten by equivalent spending on other things.' Until the nation
t William Neal Reynolds Professor of Law, Duke University.
1 Many observers prefer to define the economizing task as merely eliminating
wasteful, unnecessary care and ensuring that lower-cost methods are used whenever
quality would not suffer. See e.g., Arnold S. Relman, The Trouble with Rationing, 323
NEW ENG.J. MED. 911, 913 (1990) (expressing a physician's view that "we should be
able to afford all the services we really need"). It is irresponsible, however, not to
recognize that efficiency demands the withholding of some (marginally) beneficial
care. See Henry Aaron & William B. Schwartz, Rationing Health Care: The Choice
Before Us, 247 SCIENCE 418 (1990); David M. Eddy, What Care is "Essential'? What
Services are "Basic"?, 265JAMA 782 (1991); E. Haavi Morreim, Economic Disclosure and
Economic Advocacy: New Duties in the Medical Standard of Care, 12 J. LEGAL MED. 275
(1991); William B. Schwartz, The Inevitable Failure of Current Cost-Containment
Strategies: Why They Can Provide Only Temporay Relief, 257JAMA 220 (1987); William
B. Schwartz & Paul L.Joskow, Medical Efficacy versus Economic Efficiency: A Conflict in
Values, 299 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1462 (1978).
For examples of this author's early insistence on the importance of attacking the
cost problem in the "no-man's-land" where the benefits curve still slopes upward but
less steeply than the cost curve, see Clark C. Havighurst &James F. Blumstein, Coping
with Quality/Cost Trade-offs in Medical Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U. L. REv. 6
(1975) (with graphic illustrations); Clark C. Havighurst etal., Strategies in Underwriting
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finds ways to curb the health care sector's propensity to squander
substantial resources-perhaps whole percentage points of GNP-on
low-priority services, it will continue to neglect such needs as
improved education and job-creating capital investment. At the
moment, the nation is finding it nearly impossible to pay for
existing public and private health care programs. Without better
methods of implementing priorities in health care spending,2 it is
hard to see how health coverage can be extended to the thirty-six
million Americans who currently lack it.
3
the Costs of Catastrophic Disease, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1976, at 122 (a
painstaking attempt to be as explicit as possible, and even a bit hard-boiled, about the
need for rationing medical care even when life itself seems to be in the balance).
2 The nation's search for allocative efficiency in health care began in the 1970s
with efforts to build an infrastructure of government regulation preparatory to
enactment of some form of national health insurance. Regulation focused on limiting
the availability of health care facilities (through certificate-of-need programs) and the
amount of hospital expenses or revenues. The resulting resource constraints placed
the ultimate burden of actually rationing care on physicians rather than on public
officials. Yet the strategy of making the providers do the rationing assumed that
providers would serve primarily public values rather than their own interests in
allocating resources. SeeJeffrey E. Harris, Regulation and Internal Control in Hospitals,
55 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 88 (1979). For appraisals of the obstacles to effective
government regulatory action in pursuit of efficiency, see CLARK C. HAVIGHURST,
DEREGULATING THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 20-38 (1982); Havighurst & Blumstein,
supra note 1, at 21-45.
In 1979, Congress signified that it had lost interest in trying to solve the cost
problem through industry-wide regulation by defeating President Carter's proposal
to regulate the revenues of the nation's hospitals. In addition, the election of a
conservative administration in 1980 underscored that private health costs would
henceforth be treated as a private, not a public, responsibility. Thereafter,
government turned its attention to controlling the costs of its own programs by more
prudent purchasing, including prospective payment for hospital services and selective
contracting. Left to fend for itself, the private sector expanded its search for better
cost-containment tools. See Clark C. Havighurst, The Changing Locus of Decision
Making in the Health Care Sector, 11 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 697 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter Havighurst, The ChangingLocus]. Later discussion highlights the cost-containment
methods currently in use, showing that much progress was made but also how much
further the nation has to go in fashioning tools precise enough to do the job
properly. See infra text accompanying notes 40-69.
°It would be easier to cover the uninsured under public programs if government
could establish and enforce appropriate limits on patient entitlements, thus providing
a decent level of basic coverage rather than nearly open-ended access to all state-of-
the-art medical care. See infra notes 9-11 and accompanying text; see also infra text
accompanying note 47 (discussing the widely watched, but highly controversial, effort
in Oregon's Medicaid program to devise limits on entitlements so that coverage can
be extended to a wider population). Similar economizing measures in the private
sector might permit many of the uninsured, a majority of whom are not destitute, to
obtain private coverage. Significant enrollment of the uninsured in private plans is
likely, however, only if (1) the market for individual and small-group insurance is
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This Article explores whether "prospective self-denial"-that is,
voluntary decisions by consumers to economize by accepting
substantial restrictions on their freedom to draw upon a common
fund for future medical needs-can be useful in rationalizing societal
spending on health services. One question is whether the rationing
label applies to such voluntary restrictions on the availability of
financing. More substantively, the Article will address practical
questions having to do with the writing and administration of
private contracts, legal questions having to do with the enforceabili-
ty of such contracts, and policy questions having to do with ethics
and equity. An overriding question is whether the legal and
political culture can tolerate such private economizing or would
interfere with it so much that the only allocational mechanism
remaining as a health policy option is implicit or explicit rationing
by public authorities. At issue ultimately may be the long-run
viability of a market-oriented health policy in the United States-for,
if consumers cannot effectively exercise choice concerning the level
of their spending on health services, some public decision maker
will almost certainly have to step in and set priorities for them.
4
reformed to make such coverage more accessible, (2) more generous and better-
designed public subsidies are provided, and (3) private health plans could effectively
and strategically limit their legal obligations to make their coverage both efficient and
affordable with the resources that individuals have to spend. Although several
current reform proposals seek to satisfy the first two of these conditions, none
addresses the third. This Article concerns principally the prospects for giving private
health plans the new economizing tools they need to accommodate their offerings to
purses of different lengths. It may also shed some light, however, on how public
health plans, such as Oregon's Medicaid program, might go about rationalizing
spending.
4 Thus, although the private sector has recently had the primary responsibility for
controlling health care costs, see supra note 2, the practical limitations of private
contracts as instruments for performing this difficult task may finally cause the policy
pendulum to swing back to government as the rationing agent. But contrary to a
common assumption, achieving the goal of universal access to care does not require
sacrificing whatever advantages private contracts may have in implementing cost-
conscious consumer choices. See supra note 3. Although many practical difficulties
(adverse selection, consumer ignorance, etc.) would prevent the realization of all the
theoretical benefits of a choice- and contract-oriented policy, other reforms would
have shortcomings, too-not the least of which are the imposition of involuntary
rationing and the elimination of private choice as a method of resolving difficult
trade-offs. Consequently, even if the ideal vision of a choice-driven market could not
be fully realized, the virtues of such a market in legitimizing and facilitating
appropriate economizing might still make it, under the principle of second-best, the
superior policy choice.
Whatever the "best" policy choice might be, political inertia may leave the nation
no alternative to a strategy of incremental change. For this reason, this Article, rather
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I. THE SPECTER OF RATIONING IN THE HEALTH POLICY DEBATE
The health policy debate in the United States frequently goes
like this:
First debater: Your plan would lead to the rationing of care!
Second debater: We are rationing care alreadyl
Because such discussions deteriorate so easily into semantic
quibbles, they are apt to be unproductive. Obviously, however, both
parties to this conversation have something serious to discuss. The
first wants to talk about the effects of reform on those who
currently benefit from mainstream medical care (either as patients
or as providers), while the other is principally concerned about the
underserved. Although the concerns of each are legitimate, it
would be preferable if they could be considered separately, using
terms about which there is more agreement. A good case could be
made for banning the emotive term rationing from such discussions
altogether.
5
Broadly understood, however, some rationing of health care is
inevitable in any responsible kind of financial protection against
unpredictable health care costs. Third-party financing is notorious
for relieving physicians and patients-the primary makers of
than seeking to persuade everyone of the absolute superiority of the market strategy,
seeks only to offer constructive guidance for making the market perform better than
it has to date. In the author's view, unless the prospects for aggressive economizing
in private health care plans can be significantly improved as suggested herein, the
policy case for continued reliance on market forces is unconvincing. See Clark C.
Havighurst, Why Preserve Private Health Care Financing? [hereinafter Havighurst, Why
Preserve Private Financing?], in AMERICAN HEALTH POLICY: CRrrICAL ISSUES FOR
REFORM (forthcoming 1992) [hereinafter AMERICAN HEALTH POLICY] (arguing at
length that "firms engaged in the business of privately financing health care can make
a plausible case for their own survival only by challenging-both in the policy debate
and in their day-to-day business of writing and administering contracts to finance
health services-the practical and legal obstacles that currently impede the use of
private contracts to express consumer choices in purchasing health care"). For other
representative discussions by the author of the progress that has been made toward
decentralizing decision makingin the health care sector and of the unfinished market-
reform agenda, see Clark C. Havighurst, Decentralizing Decision Making. Private
Contract versus Professional Norms, in MARKET REFORMS IN HEALTH CARE 22 (Jack A.
Meyer ed., 1983) [hereinafter Havighurst, Decentralizing Decision Making]; Havighurst,
The Changing Locus, supra note 2; Clark C. Havighurst, The Professional Paradigm of
Medical Care: Obstacle to Decentralization, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 415 (1990) [hereinafter
Havighurst, The Professional Paradigm].
5 For varying definitions of the term and discussion of how the term is used by
different parties to the policy debate, see David C. Hadorn & Robert H. Brook, The
Health Care Resource Allocation Debate: Defining Our Terms, 266JAMA 3328, 3328-29
(1991).
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consumption decisions-of the need to consider costs in diagnosing
and treating disease. The resulting propensity to overspend, which
economists label "moral hazard," makes it imperative that there be
some rules to limit the freedom of individuals to draw upon the
payer's resources. 6 Such rules should not, however, be character-
ized as rationing in any pejorative sense. Although criticism may
fairly be directed at the content of the rules themselves and at the
fairness and accuracy with which they are administered, there
should be no question about the need for some limits on patient
entitlements.
Despite the basic legitimacy of rules restricting the availability
of health care financing, their invocation in close cases will
inevitably be characterized as rationing. Such rules, however, ration
only health care financing, not medical care itself.7 Thus, a service
that is deemed to fall outside a patient's coverage is not necessarily
denied to the patient. It may still be provided at the patient's
personal expense or at the expense of the provider-as in the case
of cross-subsidized or charitable care.8 Although a coverage limit
6 For an unusually careful elaboration by an economist of the moral hazard
problem, see PAUL L. JosKow, CONTROLLING HOSPITAL COSTs: THE ROLE OF
GOVERNMENT REGULATION 20-31 (1981). Unlike many observers, Joskow does not
give up on the market upon discovery of moral hazard. Instead, he observes that
some distortion in spending is an inevitable and very possibly acceptable cost of
financial protection, whether publicly or privately provided. He stresses, however, the
importance of giving insurers a free hand in attempting to control moral hazard.
Thus, "the efficiency of the insurance policies supplied by the market requires [1] that
competition among insurance firms yield a menu of health insurance options that
reflects the preferences of consumers and [2] that all economical opportunities to
mitigate moral hazard problems are exploited." Id. at 43.
7 See Mark A. Hall & Gerald F. Anderson, Health Insurers' Assessment of Medical
Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1637, 1676-77 & n.151 (1992) ("The denial of coverage
... merely determines that, in the insurer'sjudgment, the subscriber pool has chosen
not to pay for the particular treatment." (citation omitted)). As noted infra note 9
and accompanying text, exclusions from coverage are ultimately dictated by insurance
considerations, not by purely medical concerns. Thus, exclusion of a particular
service does not reflect a judgment that services of that type should never be
provided.
8 See, e.g., Varol v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 708 F. Supp. 826, 833 (E.D. Mich.
1989) ("Whether or not the proposed treatment is approved [by the insurer], the
physician retains the right, and indeed the ethical and legal obligation, to provide
appropriate treatment to the patient." (emphasis omitted)). Neither patients nor
providers are likely to be happy with the view that charity and cross-subsidies can
ameliorate restrictions on financing from other sources. And indeed it would be
wrong to think that "1000 points of light" can make up for significant shortfalls in
public financing. Nevertheless, charity and the redistributive capabilities of nonprofit
hospitals could provide a useful cushion against the inevitable arbitrariness of rules
governing the coverage of public and private health plans. Although this cushion
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may often cause a service not to be provided, the constraint on con-
sumption that ultimately produces this result is not any term of the
financing plan but the unwillingness (or inability) of the patient to
pay for the service out of pocket. Rationing is not a helpful term for
capturing the reality of such situations. Payers would seem to have
an affirmative obligation to curb the incidence of moral. hazard by
throwing the choice back on the insured whenever there is serious
doubt concerning a service's net benefit.9 Although this and other
cost-sharing strategies should not be used extensively in health plans
covering low-income persons, such plans need not cover every
desirable service. To characterize as rationing every exclusion from
coverage that makes income a potentially decisive determinant of
consumption is to imply the existence of an entitlement to receive
would serve better for relatively affordable items (e.g., the brain scan that the doctor
badly wants the patient to have), even big-ticket items are sometimes paid for out of
hospital resources or by outright charity (e.g., organ transplants for appealing
youngsters).
It is perhaps ironic, but efficiency might be significantly enhanced by preserving
some of the system's ability to cross-subsidize care. For if providers were able to
soften the adverse consequences of strict rules in some individual cases, then the rules
themselves could be somewhat stricter than they would have to be if they were always
necessarily determinative of the provision of possibly life-saving care.
9 Designing optimal health insurance coverage (including the appropriate level of
cost sharing) is a more complex undertaking than is usually appreciated. The factors
that must be balanced include the magnitude and predictability of the risk; the
insureds' aversion to risk and ability to bear out-of-pocket expenses; the elasticity of
demand for the service (a measure of the moral hazard associated with insuring the
risk); and the administrative cost incurred by insuring rather than paying directly. See
Martin S. Feldstein, The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance, 81J. POL. EcON. 251,
252 (1973); Clark C. Havighurst, The Role of Competition in Cost Containmen in
COMPETITION IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 285,287-89
(1978) (including a graphic illustration of the reduction in welfare loss from moral
hazard that is achievable by closer specification of the circumstances under which
payment will be made for a particular procedure). Ideally, coverage should be
designed separately for each discrete service, with thought given to every possible
exigency.
Although practical considerations would make such minute specification of
coverage difficult in any event, the favorable tax treatment of employer-paid
insurance premiums has long distorted the calculus, resulting in underuse of out-of-
pocket payments (which must be made out of after-tax rather than pretax income)
and overspending on marginally beneficial care. Because coverage has been designed
to gain a tax break, not to strike the right balance between financial protection and
higher cost resulting from moral hazard, insurers have imposed fewer restrictions
than would be socially appropriate. See JOSKOW, supra note 6, at 24-25; Martin
Feldstein & Bernard Friedman, Tax Subsidies, the Rational Demandforlnsurance and the
Health Care Crisis, 7 J. PUB. ECON. 155 (1977); Mark V. Pauly, Taxation, Health
Insurance and Market Failure in the Medical Economy, 24 J. ECON. LITERATURE. 629
(1986).
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even marginally beneficial care. Although egalitarians would like to
proclaim such a "right to health care,"10 it remains wholly supposi-
tional in the American context.
11
The controls on health care financing that are most threatening
to patients are those that threaten to deny payment for specific
services on economic rather than purely medical grounds. Although
most public and private financing plans currently employ some form
of utilization management, these cost-containment programs are
tolerable because, ostensibly at least, they seek only to eliminate
care that is inappropriate by medical standards or to ensure that
lower-cost methods are used when medically equivalent. 12  A
charge of rationing begins to sound plausible, however, if the plan
goes beyond the enforcement of medically validated criteria and
threatens to deny patients increments of medical benefit on the
ground that the cost is excessive. Nevertheless, as long as the
patient remains free to purchase noncovered care out of pocket, the
charge that care itself is being rationed should not finally stick.
Moreover, there is increasing appreciation that health care cost
containment cannot stop at curbing only nonefficacious, "flat-of-the-
curve" spending but must enter the treacherous territory of benefit!
cost trade-offs.1 Although it is very easy to criticize coverage
limits that are designed to wage the battle in the benefit/cost no-
man's-land, the sensitiveness of such limits alone does not establish
their illegitimacy or arbitrariness.
10 See MaxwellJ. Mehlman, RationingExpensiveLifesavingMedical Treatments, 1985
WIS. L. REV. 239, 268-74 (summarizing egalitarian approaches to rationing).
11 Although radical egalitarians decry-as "rationing in the cruelest sense"-any
distribution of services that reflects differences in ability to pay, the ethical issue they
raise was effectively addressed by a presidential commission in the early 1980s. See
I PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 4-6,18-
47 (1983) (stressing society's obligation to care for the poor, rejecting the notion of
an abstract "right" to health care, and concluding that government is morally bound
to ensure, not equality, but a decent minimum level of care for those who cannot
pay). For critiques of this report, including some ethicists' expressions of pragmatic
regret at the surrender of the political high ground gained by characterizing the issue
in terms of rights, see Symposium, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 223 (1984).
12 See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CONTROLLING COSTS AND CHANGING PATIENT
CARE: THE ROLE OF UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT (1989). For further discussion of
managed care, see infra text accompanying notes 50-57.
13 See supra note 1. But see Mehlman, supra note 10, at 249-82 (arguing that the
costs of rationing expensive lifesaving treatments are prohibitively high); Relman,
supra note 1, at 913 (expressing a physician's fear of any restrictions that "would cut
ever more deeply into the body of accepted medical practice").
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As the foregoing discussion shows, the ultimate issue in
appraising refusals by payers to pay for physician-prescribed health
services is not their similarity to rationing but whether they are
consistent with legitimate, pre-established rules. In a public
program providing coverage for persons generally unable to finance
their own care, the legitimacy of restrictive rules cannot be
questioned; the public has a clear right to limit any entitlements it
democratically creates. 14 Legitimacy is in doubt, however, in any
program that limits the freedom of individuals to spend their own
resources as they wish, and it is infringements on this freedom that
are most plausibly challenged as rationing. Thus, true rationing
would be salient in any government program that precluded persons
from buying for themselves either fuller coverage or more or better
care than the public program undertook to finance or provide
directly.
15
In today's health policy debates, the rationing specter is most
pertinent to proposals to create either a fixed budget for the health
14 State Medicaid programs, for example, canjustify exclusions from coverage as
efforts to live within the state's limited means. Thus, a much-discussed experiment
currently under way in the State of Oregon seeks to define with more precision than
ever before those services for which Medicaid funding will be available; a prominent
objective of that effort is to free funds so that the population covered by the program
can be expanded to include all low-income persons. See Daniel M. Fox & Howard M.
Leichter, Rationing Care in Oregon: The New Accountability, HEALTH AFF., Summer
1991, at 7; Symposium, The "Oregon Plan", 1 HEALTH MATRIX 135 (1991). Although
Oregon is frequently attacked for threatening to ration medical care, the issues raised
by its experiment are more helpfully discussed in more objective terms. See infra text
accompanying note 47.
15 Although the Medicare program, as a government-run "single-payer" program
for the elderly, purports to cover all needed care, it has the power to second-guess
specific provider prescriptions and significantly limits beneficiary freedom to pay
separately for services it disallows or to pay more for what may be higher-quality
services. Real rationing occurs, however, only when government decisions to
withhold payment reflect economic rather than purely medical considerations, and
Medicare has mostly been operated with only minimal direct constraints on the
clinical freedom of physicians and on the freedom of consumers to choose their own
treatments. Instead, cost controls have taken the form of resource constraints (e.g.,
the Prospective Payment System for hospital care) that may force providers to ration
care sub rosa. Some observers apparently prefer such indirect rationing over case-by-
case allocational decisions of a bureaucratic kind. See, e.g, Relman, supra note 1, at
912 (favoring a fixed national budget for health care that will force all providers to
make do with less). This preference for sub rosa rationing accounts for the
acceptability of HMOs, which rarely offer patients additional services at an additional
cost. See infra text accompanying notes 63-69. Decisions by providers under resource
constraints to omit desirable services involve real rationing of a nonconsensual kind
that might be (but is generally not) viewed more critically than adverse coverage
decisions by conventional third-party payers.
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care system as a whole or a single public payer to serve all citizens
under centrally determined rules and resource constraints. Implicit
in such proposals is the threat that cost controls will go well beyond
anything yet tried in the United States. If an American program
were based on the popular Canadian model, for example, one would
have to forgo public financing altogether in order to jump any
queues created by the public system. Thus, Canadian patients going
to the United States for quicker or better treatment usually must
pay their own way entirely, not just the added cost of immediate
treatment. American consumers of health care might fairly question
the legitimacy of similar restrictions on their freedom to provide for
themselves and their families.
Such rationing concerns are most likely to be voiced, of course,
only by those who are relatively well cared for under the existing
system. Although not unworthy of consideration, rationing fears
expressed by such privileged persons may not always be sincere or
well founded. Instead, they may simply be rationalizations for
opposing a fixed-budget or single-payer health care plan on other
grounds, such as its cost to taxpayers and its redistributive features.
Because it is difficult to distinguish between the invocation of
rationing as a legitimate policy objection and its use as a code word
for resistance to the claims of the poor, most expressions of
rationing fears should probably be discounted in the policy debate.
Critics can reasonably insist, however, that any national health
policy reform-such as a fixed-budget or single-payer plan-be
designed to minimize true rationing. Thus, it could fairly be asked
that government leave room for supplementation and perhaps even
permit individuals to opt out of the unified program-joining an
HMO, for example-without losing public support, for which they
have contributed their tax dollars. 16 In addition, other legal
restrictions impinging on consumer choice-such as regulatory
16 Precedent for such an option appears in the HMO option under Medicare.
Under this program, a beneficiary may enroll in an HMO with the government paying
his premium up to 95% of the estimated Adjusted Average Per Capita Cost of
supporting him in the public program. 42 U.S.C.A. §1395mm (a)(1)(E) (West Supp.
1992). See generally Paul B. Ginsburg & Glenn M. Hackbarth, Alternative Delivery
Systems and Medicare, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1986, at 6. A defect in this program,
however, is the requirement that the HMO provide essentially the same benefits as
Medicare. Regulation that prevents HMOs from explicitly limiting benefits in some
areas (implicit limitations are apparently less objectionable, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 63-69) in order to offer alternative benefits of other kinds denies
beneficiaries the opportunity to realize any saving by expressing an economizing
preference-say, for minimal life-saving efforts toward the end of life.
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limitations on facility growth, on the introduction of new technolo-
gy, or on hospital revenues-can also be objected to as true rationing
if carried too far.17 If the specter of rationing could be under-
stood only as one of the details to be addressed in any government-
controlled program, then use of the term might be helpful in
drawing attention to particular fairness issues. Unfortunately,
however, the term has lost much of its precision and utility in policy
debates.
II. RATIONING IN PRIVATE CONTEXTS
How valid is the rationing charge when it is a private financing
intermediary, not the government, that imposes a restriction that
interferes with a patient's treatment? Putting aside the point that
it may be only financing, not medical care itself, that is denied to
the patient, what is the force of the patient's claim to more or better
treatment than the payer is willing to finance? The issues are still
consistency of the denial of coverage with written rules and the
legitimacy of those rules. In this case, however, once legitimacy is
established (perhaps by the consensual character of the restrictions
imposed), the restrictions themselves, having been privately
adopted, would not seem to be open to scrutiny on public policy
grounds. Still, it may not be so easy to remove the substantive
merits of particular cost controls from the health policy debate to
the realm of private contract. There is substantial resistance in the
legal and political culture to the idea of letting contracts be
contracts whenever they operate to restrict the availability of health
care financing.
18
The argument here is that private contracts in which consumers
accept well-considered, explicit limitations on their future claims
17 See supra note 2.
18 See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURiTY, THE INFLUENCE OF CURRENT
JUDICIAL DOCTRINES ON THE COST OF PURCHASING HEALTH CARE 15-26 (1991); Alice
G. Gosfield, Value Purchasing and Effectiveness: Legal Implications, in 1991 HEALTH
LAw HANDBOOK 185-87, 194-211 (Alice G. Gosfield ed.) (despite public policy's
increased reliance on payers to control health care costs, "some traditional legal
principles have the capacity to undermine these new and apparently well-accepted
policy goals" Id. at 187); James S. Cline & Keith A. Rosten, The Effect of Policy
Language on the Containment of Health Care Cost, 21 TORT & INS. LJ. 120 (1985); Hall
& Anderson,supra note 7, at 1684 & nn.173-75; PaulJ. Molino, Reimbursement Disputes
Involving Experimental Medical Treatment, 24J. HEALTH & HOSP. L. 329 (1991); Paul
E. Kalb, Note, Controlling Health Care Costs by Controlling Technology: A Private
Contractual Approach, 99 YALE L.J. 1109, 1117-19 (1990).
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against a health insurer can and should be employed more actively
and aggressively in the cost-containment effort. 19 To be sure,
contracts having the requisite degree of specificity and clarity would
be extremely difficult to write.20 But insurers and other private
financing intermediaries cannot reasonably be expected to develop,
market, and implement innovative contractual limitations on patient
entitlements unless they have some assurance that the legal system
will be receptive to their efforts. A crucial question is whether ex
ante self-denial by economizing consumers would be accepted at
face value by the legal system when issues arise ex post.
2 1
A. Alternative Conceptions of the Health Insurance Contract
The easy equation of private cost containment with government
rationing results from the perception that a private payer denying
payment for a desired service is not accountable to the individual
patient and is similar in this respect to a public financing program.
Particularly in the context of litigation challenging a refusal to pay
for a particular service, a private payer necessarily appears as a
corporate deep pocket with interests fundamentally opposed to
those of insured patients.2 2 The legal resolution of health insur-
ance coverage disputes is greatly influenced by the perception of the
insurer as a powerful player in an unequal game. Unless health
19 The stronger message is that insurers and other payers must address choices
at the margin where the health benefits yielded by a service may not be great enough
to warrant the expenditure of private funds. See supra note 1. For an ethicist's
strong claim that the only rationing of medical care that is morally legitimate is that
to which the patient has explicitly or implicitly consented ex ante, see PAUL T.
MENZEL, STRONG MEDICINE: THE ETHICAL RATIONING OF HEALTH CARE (1990). For
additional, mostly pragmatic arguments for relying on decentralized rather than
centralized decision making to address the central dilemmas of health care spending,
see sources cited supra note 4.
20 See infra text accompanying notes 87-89.
21 See generally sources cited supra note 18. Hall & Anderson observe that the
legal system has not yet had to worry about aggressive health care rationing pursuant
to contractual undertakings, yet still resists insurer efforts to curb spending. Without
endorsing aggressive rationing, they note that "at present, the issue is two steps
removed from this more controversial stage since insurers are bogged down in the
first level of assessment, namely, basic safety and effectiveness." Hall & Anderson,
supra note 7, at 1638 n.85. For the view that, if insurers do not begin fairly soon to
fight the cost-containment battle where it must be won, a governmental takeover may
be inevitable, see Havighurst, Why Preserve Private Financing? supra note 4.
22 "Because an insurance company pays out to beneficiaries from its own assets
rather than the assets of a trust, its fiduciary role lies in perpetual conflict with its
profit-making role as a business." Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 898 F.2d 1556,
1561 (11th Cir. 1990).
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insurance contracts can be viewed in a different light, consumers
will be limited in their ability to control, through their choices, the
cost of the health care they receive.
1. The View Apparent in Insurance Law
Insurance law generally reflects the perception that consumers
are never equal to the task of negotiating fair terms with insurers.
Thus, courts customarily view insurance contracts as contracts of
adhesion and construe them liberally in favor of the insured.
23
This practice is also justified on the familiar ground that the party
drafting an agreement should bear the consequences of any
ambiguity.2 4 Moreover, even in the absence of ambiguity, courts
23 "[B]ecause insureds almost never have any bargaining power vis-a-vis their
insurance carrier, insurance policies are often characterized as 'contracts of adhesion,'
meaning courts should give the benefit of the doubt to the insured because the
insured had little or no choice about the selection of the policy language." David B.
Goodwin, Disputing Insurance Coverage Disputes, 43 STAN. L. REV. 779, 787 (1991)
(reviewing BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE
COVERAGE DIsPUTES (3d ed. 1990)).
24 Contra proferentum ("against the proffering party") is a principle of contract
interpretation generally employed in insurance coverage disputes. "There are literally
thousands of judicial opinions resolving insurance coverage disputes in favor of
claimants on the basis that a provision of the insurance policy at issue was ambiguous
and therefore should be construed against the insurer." ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN
I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 6:3(a)(2), at 629 (Student ed. 1988).
Although this principle is reasonable in the abstract, the ambiguity triggering
pro-plaintiff interpretation lies to a considerable extent in the eye of the beholder-
that is, the judge, who may be naturally inclined to exercise interpretive authority to
reach pleasing results rather than intended or efficient ones. Some modern students
of the problem of interpretation, extending insights of the earlier "legal realists,"
denigrate the ability of constitutional, statutory, or contractual language to convey any
precise meaning, thus leaving much of the power to prescribe rules defacto in the
hands of interpreters, particularlyjudges. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN.
L. REV. 1325 (1984). Although Fish's view that "language is always apprehended
within a set of interpretive assumptions," id. at 1331 n.13, is unexceptionable,
problems arise when the interpreter decides precisely which assumptions, whose
"understanding, largely tacit, of the enterprise's general purpose," id. at 1343, should
guide interpretation. Thus, even while conceding the skill with which Fish and others
have demonstrated the shortcomings of language for expressing useable, objective
principles, one can regret the legitimacy that their theories implicitly confer upon the
activism ofjudges, who may already be overly inclined to reform private relationships
and to shape substantive law and policy to accord with the predilections of some
"interpretive community." In its most dangerous forms, the new denigration of
language combines with a dogmatic perception that power and repressive politics
govern all drafting efforts, thus strengthening the interpreter's presumed warrant for
bringing his own political preferences into play. In insurance law, the legitimacy of
judges' policy-writing role depends heavily upon the perception that consumers have
no effective say in writing the contract. This is an empirical issue, however, and it
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sometimes require insurers to honor the "reasonable expectations"
of the insured, with the result that insurers regularly find themselves
offering judge-made rather than contractually defined coverage.
25
In addition to being held to high standards of clarity in drafting and
of disclosure in marketing, insurers are also generally deemed to
have a special duty of fair dealing toward their insureds. Conse-
quently, they face punitive damages for acting in bad faith if they
deny claims too casually or insist too strongly upon their own
construction of their contracts.
26
As demonstrated by Hall and Anderson elsewhere in this
symposium, courts tend to approach health insurance coverage
disputes with many of the same attitudes they bring to the interpre-
tation of other insurance contracts.2 7 Health insurers thus find
themselves in a poor position to engage in aggressive economizing.
One problem they face is that ambiguity is especially hard to avoid
in drafting rules which attempt to limit health coverage to vital
needs. Insurers first tried to define meaningful coverage limits in
their contracts by requiring that covered care be "medically
necessary." Because this condition was inherently ambiguous,
would be destructive of general consumer interests for the legal system, looking out
only for the interests of individual patients, to proceed under general principles
premised on an assumption that consumer interests are never well served in insurance
contracts.
2 5 See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 24, § 6.3; see also Kenneth S. Abraham,Judge-
Made Law andJudge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured,
67 VA. L. RPv. 1151, 1154-55 (1981) (noting that the doctrine of "reasonable
expectations" has two aspects: an insurer may merely have some duty to dispel
incorrect expectations of unsophisticated insureds; alternatively, contracts may be
judicially rewritten in light of community standards of fairness and equity).
2 6 See generally PROPERTY INS. LAW COMM., AM. BAR ASs'N, BAD FAITH AND
PUNITIVE DAMAGES: ANNOTATIONS TO FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE CASES, STATUTES, AND
REGULATIONS (1986) (incorporating cases from the fifty states and the District of
Columbia); WILLIAM M. SHERNOFF ET AL., INSURANCE BAD FAITH LITIGATION ch.8
(1991 & Supp.). Although this legal rule is entirely reasonable (in view of the
temptation for insurers to adopt a "So-sue-mel" stance instead ofpayingvalid claims),
there is again a risk that it will fall into the wrong hands-in this case, juries
unsympathetic to insurers and unappreciative of their efforts to control costs. See also
infra note 35 and test accompanying note 76.
27 See Hall & Anderson, supra note 7, at 1684 nn.173-75; see also sources cited
supra note 21. Contracts for group health insurance are negotiated with the insurer
by relatively sophisticated employers and therefore do not have the take-it-or-leave-it
character of contracts of adhesion-unless one believes that employers, instead of
being reliable agents of their employees, are themselves inclined to impose unfair
terms. See infra text accompanying notes 78-81. The nonadhesive character of such
contracts has apparently not caused courts to alter their approach in construing them,
however.
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however, courts were free to adopt expansive readings, requiring
coverage whenever the doctor's prescription did not offend the
standards of the medical profession.28 Moreover, when insurers
tried to be more precise in writing their contracts, they were hardly
more successful. Because greater precision required longer words
and finer print, courts could take the view that the contract was now
beyond subscriber understanding and deny it an objective reading
on that account.29 In each case involving retrospective denial of
a claim, courts could cite the reasonable expectations of the insured
as a basis for requiring payment for any service not irresponsibly
prescribed by the physician.3
°
Many health insurers have tried to solve these problems-
ambiguity and patient expectations-by establishing procedures
under which coverage is established prospectively, before treatment
is actually rendered. Although this "managed-care" approach has
allowed some treatments to be tailored to insurers' economizing
requirements, 31 it has also raised a risk that the insurer or those
administering pretreatment review may be liable for adverse
consequences arguably resulting from the denial of payment.32 It
28 See, e.g., Schroeder v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 450 N.W.2d 470, 475-77 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1989) (doctor's prescription of home nursing care honored); Tudor v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 539 N.Y.S.2d 690, 691 (Dist. Ct. 1989) (diagnostic testing
held covered despite insurer's claim that it was not medically reasonable); Sarchett v.
Blue Shield, 729 P.2d 267, 270-73, 277 (Cal. 1987) (discussing application of medical
necessity test and finding liability for insurer's failure to bring to insured's attention
his contractual right to have a medical society committee finally resolve dispute);
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 470 So. 2d 1060, 1074-75 (Ala. 1984) (hospitalization
deemed covered despite claim that outpatient care would have sufficed). But see
Lockshin v. Blue Cross, 434 N.E.2d 754, 757 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980) (reversing trial
court's requirement of reimbursement for private nursing care following uncomplicat-
ed Cesarean delivery). See generally Annotation, What Services, Equipmen, or Supplies
Are "Medically Necessay "for Purposes of Coverage under Medical Insurance, 75 A.L.R.4th
763 (1990).
2 See, e.g., Ponder v. Blue Cross, 193 Cal. Rptr. 632, 639-40 (Ct. App. 1983). Hall
& Anderson observe that, although courts frequently cite a lack of contractual
specificity as a ground for finding a service covered, they are apt to object to the
contract's opacity when confronted with a highly technical explicit exclusion. See Hall
& Anderson, supra note 7, at 1648 n.34 & 1684 nn.173-74.
30 See, e.g., Hughes v. Blue Cross, 263 Cal. Rptr. 850, 857 (Ct. App. 1989), rev.
denied, 1990 Cal. LEXIS 890 (Cal.), cert. dismissed, 495 U.S. 944 (1990) (allowing an
award of punitive damages on the grounds that an insurer's employment of 'a
standard of medical necessity significantly at variance with the medical standards of
the community ... frustrates] the justified expectations of the insured [and] is
inconsistent with the liberal construction of policy language required by the duty of
good faith").
31 See infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
32 It is widely anticipated, and California courts have indicated, that tort-like
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has also meant that some major coverage disputes have arisen while
the patient was awaiting expensive treatment, often of an arguably
life-saving kind. In these cases, the issue is frequently the applica-
tion of a contractual provision excluding "experimental" therapy
from coverage under the policy. Almost by definition, an experi-
mental procedure cannot be precisely identified in advance for the
purpose of unambiguously excluding it from the contract. More-
over, in addition to being inherently ambiguous and interpretable
only with the help of partisan experts, such exclusions usually come
before the court on a motion for preliminary relief. In these
circumstances, instead of finally interpreting the contract, the court
"balances the equities," which often means weighing the insurer's
wealth against the patient's (unproved) claim that his life is in the
balance. As demonstrated in a series of cases involving coverage of
costly autologous bone-marrow transplants as a cancer treatment,
ambiguities are easy to find and to resolve in the patient's favor.
33
It is particularly easy in such cases to forget that more than the cost
of a single medical emergency is at stake.
The federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA)34 offers some apparent relief from state law to health
plans established by employers for their employees. One significant
effect of ERISA is to foreclose state common-law remedies for bad-
faith breaches of the plan contract.35 In addition, although the
liability may be imposed for injuries deemed to have been caused by a utilization
manager's failing to adhere to community medical standards in deciding on the
availability of financing. See Wilson v. Blue Cross, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876, 882-85 (Ct.
App. 1990) (reversing grant of insurer's summary judgment motion and holding
contract, which gave plan no discretion to deny payment on medical grounds,
determinative); Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 819-20 (Ct. App. 1986) (no
liability where physician had not sought extension of previously approved hospital
stay). See generally John D. Blum, An Analysis of Legal Liability in Health Care
Utilization Review and Case Management, 26 Hous. L. REV. 191 (1989); William A.
Helvestine, Legal Implications of Utilization Review, in INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra
note 12, at 169; see also infra note 77.
33 See, e.g., Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 741 F. Supp. 586, 589-94 (E.D. Va.
1990) (coverage found on strength of physicians' testimony that treatment was not
experimental); Cole v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 738 F. Supp. 42, 43 (D. Mass.
1990) (coverage found despite evidence that treatment is successful in only 9% of
similar cases); Bradley v. Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 562 N.Y.S.2d 908, 908
(Sup. Ct. 1990) ("[B]oth chemotherapy and bone marrow transplants have a sufficient
history to support the medical community's conclusion that they are not investigative
treatments"). See generally ADvISoRY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 18,
at 19-21; Hall & Anderson, supra note 7, at 1684 nn.173-75; Frank P. James, The
Experimental Treatment Exclusion Clause, 12 J. LEGAL MED. 359, 360-62 (1991).
34 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
35 See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 50 (1987) (state tort remedy for
19921 1769
1770 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 140:1755
statute preserves state regulation of the business of insurance,
employers that opt for self-insurance escape scrutiny under state
insurance law. Review of such plans' denials of coverage thus
occurs in federal court under ERISA itself. On its face at least,
ERISA is more permissive than state law. Thus, if an ERISA plan
contract explicitly gives the plan administrator the power to
interpret the scope of benefit provisions, the resulting discretionary
determinations will be upheld if they are not arbitrary or capricious;
de novo review occurs only when the contract does not confer such
a presumption of legitimacy on the administrator's interpreta-
tions.36  Nevertheless, because ERISA incorporates fiduciary
principles from trust law, courts reviewing administrators' actions
are alert to administrators' apparent conflicts of interest. Thus,
judicial review of coverage disputes under ERISA may not be as
permissive as the arbitrary-or-capricious standard would suggest.
3 7
bad faith held not so specifically directed at insurers as to be a state law that
"regulates insurance"; remedy thus not saved from federal preemption by ERISA's
"saving clause" for state insurance regulation); see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-67 (1987) (holding complaints in state court purporting to
plead state common-law causes of action against insurer are removable under ERISA
to federal court); McRae v. Seafarers' Welfare Plan, 933 F.2d 1021 (11th Cir. 1991)
(holding punitive damages unavailable under ERISA).
Partly as a result of activism by trial lawyers, there is significant interest in
Congress at the moment in proposals to overturn the Pilot Life ruling, making
administrators of ERISA plans subject once again to the stringencies of state law. See
S. 794, H.R. 1602, H.R. 2782, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); HEARING ON H.R. 1602
AND H.R. 2782: BILLs RELATING TO ERISA's PREEMPTION OF CERTAIN STATE LAWS
BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, HOUSE COMM. ON
EDUCATION AND LABOR, July 18, 1991 (Ser. No. 102-38); infra text accompanying
notes 76-77. Such legislation would have potentially severe adverse effects on
insurers' ability to contest questionable spending decisions by providers. ERISA itself
provides for attorney-fee shifting and removal of plan administrators as sanctions
against poor management.
86 See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) (construing
ERISA § 1132(a)(1)(B)).
"' For examples of the ease with which arbitrariness is found, see Egert v.
Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 900 F.2d 1032,1036-38 (7th Cir. 1990) (held arbitrary
not to classify in vitro fertilization as "treatment" for an "illness"); Reilly v. Blue Cross
and Blue Shield United, 846 F.2d 416, 420-24 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 856
(1988) (held arbitrary for Blue plan, acting as administrator of ERISA plan, to find
in vitro fertilization an uncovered "experimental" procedure on the basis of standards
that were developed by association of Blue plans in their capacity as self-interested
insurers and that used a 50% success rate as an arbitrary rule of thumb in deciding
on the acceptability of costly new procedures). For ERISA cases on coverage for
autologous bone marrow transplants, see Adams v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 757 F.
Supp. 661 (D. Md. 1991) (coverage found on de novo review); Sweeney v. Gerber
Prods. Co. Med. Ben. Plan, 728 F. Supp. 594 (D. Neb. 1989) (coverage not found).
See also ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 18, at 21-23 ("The result
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2. The Insurance Contract As an Instrument of
Prospective Self-Denial
Although courts are accustomed to interpreting insurance
contracts on the assumption that insurers resist claims solely in their
own interest, it is often valid to view a health insurer in a very
different light-as the administrator of a contract among all the
insureds covered by the policy. Thus, some health insurance
policies are appropriately conceptualized as agreements by which
members of the covered group mutually elected to be bound in
order that the fund created by their contributions would be
sufficient to cover their essential needs and would not be squan-
dered on nonessential, inefficacious, or overly costly services
demanded by any individual. Under this view, an insurer rationing
health care financing by invoking a coverage restriction can be seen
as serving consumer interests as well as its own. Moreover, it is of
little conceptual relevance that the form of the transaction puts the
insurer's interest directly on the line.38 Even if a specific case
features a commercial insurer or a self-insured employer seeking to
minimize a short-term risk that it assumed, the cost of open-ended
contractual entitlements must ultimately be covered by raising
insurance premiums or reducing take-home pay. Although insurers
do not always act solely as executors of the wishes of their insureds,
a conceptualization of the health insurance contract that casts them
presumptively in that role would greatly improve the legal climate
for private economizing in the purchasing of health care.
3 9
of the Firestone case [see supra note 36] has been that almost every ERISA welfare
benefit case has since been decided in favor of the participant who has been denied
coverage.")
38 Mutual insurers and insurers acting as administrators of health plans of self-
insured employers have no direct conflict of interests, and freestanding utilization
management firms normally have no financial interest in denying coverage in a given
case. In each case, of course, there is a responsibility to control cost, poor
performance of which could result in a loss of lucrative business for the firm.
Nevertheless, the market makes all parties ultimately accountable in some degree to
insureds and their agents, see infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text, making it a
mistake to be too fastidious about apparent interest conflicts, which are difficult to
avoid in this area without incurring high costs. (HMOs, after all, have served
consumers well precisely because they have a disincentive to spend.) On conflict of
interests in the management of ERISA plans, see Hall & Anderson, supra note 7, at
1668 nn.120-23.
39 Hall & Anderson observe that, in ERISA cases, the employer creating the plan
and those administering it on the employer's behalf are more apt to be regarded as
fiduciaries with a responsibility for protecting the fund for the benefit of the
employees as a group. See Hall & Anderson, supra note 7, at 1669 n.124; see also
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Plaintiffs' lawyers and other bashers of the insurance industry
naturally reject so benign a view of the health insurance contract.
But rules of policy interpretation premised upon their paradigm of
insurer/insured relationships in health care ignore the stake that
consumers themselves may have in enforcing contractual limits on
entitlements. Precisely because of the unusual degree of moral
hazard encountered by consumers in pooling health care risks, a
more objective approach to contract interpretation is needed.
Health insurance coverage disputes not only determine which party
will bear a large incurred loss but also affect future decisions to
consume care. Finding coverage in a given case will encourage
additional spending of the same kind by other insureds and
discourage insurer efforts to control marginal spending by contrac-
tual exclusions. Unless the legal system respects and assists
responsible, aggressive insurer efforts to control costs and curb the
influence of chronic moral hazard on consumption decisions, health
care costs will continue to elude effective control through private
efforts.
B. The Need for Better Contractual Authorization for
Health Care Rationing
To be sure, health insurers have some weapons with which to
combat moral hazard. Their armamentarium is generally inade-
quate, however, for fighting the battle for cost containment where
it must ultimately be won-in the no-man's-land where unpropitious
benefit/cost ratios mean that some potentially beneficial care
should be forgone. Brief examination of the shortcomings of
payers' existing weaponry will reveal why health care plans of
various kinds need to be able-both practically and legally-to write
and enforce contracts by which consumers can commit themselves
today to accept some rationing of health care financing tomorrow.
1. Cost Sharing
Patient cost sharing is perhaps the most familiar device by which
health insurers attempt to curb moral hazard. Because of its
administrative simplicity and its dampening effect on insurance-
subsidized demand,40 cost sharing should be part of any program
Daniel Fischel &John H. Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive
Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1105 (1988).
40 But see Albert L. Siu et al., Inappropriate Use of Hospitals in a Randomized Trial
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of health care financing. Deductibles and coinsurance tend to be
underutilized in practice, however, partly because out-of-pocket
payments for health care are more costly to the consumer, after
taxes, than the same payments made indirectly through an insurance
fund (most contributions to which escape both income and payroll
taxes). 41 In addition, one sees little effort by payers to fine-tune
cost sharing in pursuit of microefficiency in health care spending.
Instead, most deductibles are set at low levels signifying a desire
only to shift some basic costs to insureds, not to use price to curb
moral hazard. Similarly, coinsurance rates are set at levels that
underdeter consumption of many marginal services.
In optimal insurance schemes, deductibles would often be such
that the plan would pay only for relatively catastrophic care; in
addition, coinsurance rates, instead of being generally uniform
across all covered services,42 would vary from service to service,
depending upon the degree of discretion involved and the likeli-
hood of patient benefit.43 Such fine-tuning of cost sharing would
obviously challenge the drafters of health plan contracts. But that
is precisely the point to be appreciated-the need for better
contractual tools with which to attack cost problems at the micro
level.4
2. Exclusions from Coverage
Another common strategy for reducing health insurance costs
is to exclude whole categories of disease or treatment from coverage
under the policy. As presently employed, however, this strategy is
also not capable of reliably directing money to meeting only the
of Health Insurance Plans, 315 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1259, 1259 (1986) ("cost sharing did
not selectively reduce inappropriate hospitalization").
41 See supra note 9.
42 This is the normal pattern, although many policies cover a lesser percentage
(often 50%) of outpatient mental health care, on the theory that such care is
especially discretionary.
43 See supra note 9 on the design of optimal health insurance. Many decisions in
designing an optimal plan depend upon nonmedical considerations such as income
and attitudes toward risk.
44 Query whether a court would be any more receptive to an exclusion from
coverage if it were partial rather than complete-e.g., if the plan required 50%
coinsurance on any "experimental" procedure rather than attempting to exclude such
procedures from coverage altogether. Also, would a plan fare any better if it actively
assisted subscribers in financing their share of possibly costly noncovered procedures?
Such an approach, although it would expose the plan to some credit losses, would
betoken a kinder and gentler attitude on the payer's part.
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most essential needs. The most common exclusions-including such
things as mental health care, preventive care, home health care,
long-term care, dental care, cosmetic surgery, organ transplants,
substance abuse, and care provided by nonphysician practitioners-
may certainly involve care of somewhat lower priority (either as
health needs or as candidates for insurance coverage) than many
covered services. But such gross exclusions are clumsy rationing
tools in the same way that meat axes are inferior to scalpels in doing
surgery.45 Some highly beneficial services in the excluded catego-
ries are inevitably excised from coverage, while some very question-
able services continue to be financed because contract language is
not precise enough to exclude them.
46
The need for more precision in contract drafting is once again
apparent. -In order for coverage to be withheld or limited only in
circumstances where moral hazard looms too large, gross exclusions
need to be replaced by more particularized benefit packages.
Although the current and much-discussed experiment with benefit
redesign in the Oregon Medicaid plan seeks to establish better
priorities for public financing, it still depends heavily upon a
categorical approach.47 Thus, it undertakes to rank 709 medical
conditions and procedures in order of medical and social priority,
allowing the state legislature to decide how far down the list to go
with public funding. (Currently, it is proposed to draw the line just
above #588, low-back pain.4 8) Ideally, however, instead of employ-
45 A particularly worrisome feature of categorical exclusions is the opportunity
they present for consumers to use their superior knowledge of their own circumstanc-
es to switch in and out of plans in anticipation of particular needs. See CLARK C.
HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE LAW AND PoLicy: READINGS, NOTES, AND QUESTIONS
1108, 1108-10 (1988) ("Adverse selection is potentially the Achilles heel of a health
policy based on consumer choice .... It is, however, an intensely practical problem
that may be amenable to practical solutions."). For thoughtful discussions of adverse
selection under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (a possible model for
a system based on individual consumer choice), see Alain C. Enthoven, Effective
Management of Competition in the FEHBP, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1989, at 34; Stanley B.
Jones, Can Multiple Choice Be Managed to Constrain Health Care Costs?, HEALTH AFF.,
Fall 1989, at 54. For the view that insurance contracts tailoring coverage across the
board to reflect benefit/cost ratios would not encounter adverse selection to nearly
the same degree as plans that economize by categorical exclusions, see infra note 118.
Regulation that may be needed to prevent insurers from themselves playing adverse-
selection games-to attract healthy risks and repel or discard bad ones-should not
preclude economizing contracts of the kinds proposed later in this Article.
46 Ironically, however, this same clumsiness is a virtue when the contract comes
to court. Lacking ambiguity, categorical exclusions are more certain to be enforced
than exclusions that depend on medical or administrative judgment.
47 See supra note 14.
48 Robert Steinbrook & Bernard Lo, The Oregon Medicaid Demonstration Project:
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ing this categorical approach, Oregon would prescribe for every
medical condition a standard treatment protocol that the state
would agree to finance. Allowing for exceptional cases, these
protocols would omit-that is, exclude from coverage-any specific
service whose expected benefits under particular circumstances did
not measure up in a rough comparison with the benefits achievable
by putting the same funds to alternative medical uses. Private plans,
too, need to get beyond categorical exclusions and to practice a
more precise kind of selectivity with respect to covered services,
thereby placing more specific and more appropriate limits on the
freedom of providers and patients to draw on insurance funds.
Even if contractual exclusions from health insurance coverage
cannot be made clinically specific beyond a certain point, it makes
sense to take specificity as far as it is practical to go. Later
discussion will show that some of the apparent difficulties could in
fact be overcome. There is at least a reasonable prospect that




In recent years, many cost-containment strategists have begun
to shift their attention away from strategic weapons-such as across-
the-board cost sharing and gross categorical exclusions from
coverage-to measures that can be aimed at more precise targets.
The tactical weapons that have been deployed so far all fall under
the heading of "managed care."50 In its most overt form, managed
care involves sending specially trained strike forces, equipped with
computer technology, to make preemptive attacks on questionable
uses of resources in conventional medical practice.51 This tactical
Will It Provide Adequate Medical Care?, 326 NEW ENG. J. MED. 340, 341 (1992).
49 See infra text accompanying notes 71-82.
-0 "Managed care" is an umbrella term covering a wide range of cost-containment
efforts aimed at influencing clinical decision making with a view to preventing
overutilization of services.
51 Utilization management may occur implicitly, as in a group-practice HMO, or
overtly, as in a fee-for-service insurance plan that makes prior authorization by the
payer a condition of coverage for nonemergency care. In plans of the latter type, it
is common for the payer-either an insurer or a self-insured employer-to employ a
freestandingutilization management firm whose personnel use advanced communica-
tions and information technology to screen and approve specific physician
prescriptions. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 12, at 13-21, 58-90. Such
utilization management is controversial because of its interference with physician/
patient decision making and the high administrative cost of overseeing individual
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approach still has only limited potential, however, for effective
action in the heartland of the cost problem. Indeed, it is usually
targeted only at limited objectives lying on the problem's fringes.
As with other strategies, its limitations lie partly in the shortcomings
of private contract. Payers have not yet gotten clear contractual
authority from consumers to withhold financing in the most
contested territory-where beneficial care must be forgone if
consumers' resources are to be saved for other, more beneficial
uses.
52
It is doubtful that a consumer, in joining a health care plan that
practices utilization management, thereby authorizes the plan to
deny payment for any beneficial service within the scope of the
plan's general coverage. Nor does a consumer joining such a plan
authorize any provider of covered care to omit any precaution or to
sacrifice any increment of arguable quality in his treatment. Indeed,
the legal situation is quite otherwise. The typical health plan
generally undertakes to cover all diagnosis and treatment that is
"medically necessary,"53 and physicians are generally subject to
malpractice liability for any injury deemed to have been caused by
a failure to take or prescribe any measure or precaution required
under the prevailing legal standard of care.54 In this legal environ-
ment, there is little room for economizing beyond that which has
been generally accepted in medical practice. Without contractual
treatment decisions. Physicians find such oversight burdensome, offensive to their
professional pride, and illegitimate insofar as it restrains their efforts to provide
professionally (as opposed to economically) optimal care. They also object to the
absence of clear standards and to the multiplicity of payers whose differing,
sometimes bewildering, expectations they must try to satisfy. See Gerald W. Grumet,
Health Care Rationing Through Inconvenience: The Third Party's Secret Weapon, 321 NEW
ENG.J. MED. 607 (1989).
52 If health plans had a clear contractual warrant for withholding coverage of
some marginally beneficial care, their managed-care efforts would enjoy more
legitimacy than under present arrangements. See supra note 51. In theory at least,
that legitimacy would be even greater if the plan openly spelled out in advance and
in detail, for both subscribers and providers to see, the conditions under which
specific services would and would not be paid for. Currently, utilization managers
generally refuse to reveal their criteria for screening treatment proposals on the
ground that physicians might learn how to evade them.
5s See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
4 See Randall Bovbjerg, The Medical Malpractice Standard of Care: HMOs and
Customary Practice, 1975 DUKE LJ. 1375; Allan H. McCoid, The Care Required of
Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REv. 549 (1959) (classic article illustrating and
approving the legal system's embrace of professional standards, without reference to
the role of health insurance in diminishing the accountability of physicians for the
cost of care).
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authorization, economizing forays by payers or providers into the
no-man's-land of benefit/cost trade-offs are likely to be unsuccessful
and may be heavily penalized, perhaps with punitive damages.
55
The legal system's authority, defacto or dejure, to prescribe the
payment obligations of health care plans and the diagnostic and
treatment obligations of health care providers is fraught with peril
to the efficiency with which society uses its scarce resources. Both
the legal test for identifying what care is "medically necessary"
under conventional insurance contracts and the legal standard of
care employed in identifying medical negligence are drawn by
courts in specific cases from customary medical practice, as testified
to by partisan medical experts. Because the legal-cum-professional
standard applicable to a particular clinical situation is often difficult
to discover, both payers and providers, fearful of liability, tend to
give the law a wide berth, resolving doubts systematically in favor of
overspending. Even when its requirements are clear, the law
regularly sends inappropriate signals. What physicians customarily
do under the distorted economic incentives and ill-considered legal
compulsions they face is a wholly unsatisfactory benchmark for
deciding what is appropriate either for society as a whole or for any
particular insured group.
Indeed, the legal environment practically guarantees that the
nation will spend excessively on useless and marginally useful
medical care. Customary medical practice, from which the law
borrows its standards, is by definition what consumers and taxpayers
's On the liability risks faced by payers and utilization managers, see supra note
32. For scholarly efforts to come to grips with the problem of defining malpractice
standards of care that are realistic about economic trade-offs, see Bovbjerg, supra note
54, at 1408-14 (addressing the defenses available for economizing efforts by HMOs
and their physicians); Mark A. Hall, The Malpractice Standard of Care Under Health Care
Cost Containment, 17 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 347 (arguing that malpractice
standards can evolve toward efficiency under the "respectable minority" principle);
Edward B. Hirshfeld, Economic Considerations in Treatment Decisions and the Standard
of Care in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 264JAMA 2004 (1990) (view from the legal
department of the American Medical Association); E. Haavi Morreim, Cost
Containment and the Standard of Medical Care, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1719 (1987) (arguing
that third-party judgments on appropriateness should affect standard to which
provider is held); E. Haavi Morreim, Stratified Scarcity: Redefining the Standard of Care,
17 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 356 (1989) (similar); John A. Siliciano, Wealth, Equity,
and the Unitay Medical Malpractice Standard, 77 VA. L. REV. 439 (1991) (arguing that
standard should be modified to reflect patient's resources and ability to pay). It is a
revealing feature of the legal culture that scholars such as these typically propose
their favored reforms for spontaneous implementation by the courts rather than as
ideas to be incorporated in private contracts.
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are currently finding it so difficult to pay for. And only cognitive
dissonance, endemic in our political discussion of these issues, can
account for the prevalent confidence that the nation could afford to
give millions of uninsured Americans uninhibited access to
customary, state-of-the art medical care. For conclusive evidence
that the nation will never be able to afford to pay for all the services
that would become customary in a heavily insured medical care
system, one need look no further than the fact that each year the
cost of personal health care increases faster than national wealth, as
measured by GNP.56 The goal of ensuring universal access to the
miracles of modern medicine is, in other words, becoming costlier,
not easier, to achieve with each passing year and with nearly every
medical advance. By one means or another, the nation will someday
have to learn how to economize on medical care even when it hurts.
It is hard to overstate the magnitude of this challenge or the
desirability of seeing whether private contract can be enlisted in the
effort to meet it.
In the current legal environment, managed care is severely
limited in the economizing it can accomplish. Without radical
contractual redefinition of patient entitlements, care must be
managed to meet objectives that are prescribed by the legal system
in conjunction with professional interests, not by those who must
somehow pay the cost. Although managed care is certainly useful
in eliminating some truly unnecessary, -inefficacious care and in
inducing the use of some (medically acceptable) lower-cost methods,
it can be of little help, without better contractual warrants, to
consumers seeking to economize in those areas where they might
find some actual risk taking worthwhile. Conceivably, the legal
limits on economizing are so vague, so elastic, or so rarely invoked
that managed-care guerrilla units can effectively fight some battles
in the no-man's-land of benefit/cost trade-offs. It should still be
asked, however, with what authority they do so.57 Without con-
tractual authority to fight the war, managed-care plans will never be
able to win it.
56 See Sally T. Sonnefeld et al., Projections of National Health Expenditures Through
the Year 2000, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Fall 1991, at 1, 7 (table 4).
17 Menzel argues that, in some circumstances, the patient's implied consent
("presumed prior consent to risk") can provide a sufficient moral warrant for
rationing. See MENZEL, supra note 19, at 22-36. It would seem apparent, however,
that explicit authority is always to be preferred. But see infra note 80 on the
inapplicability of the legal doctrine of informed consent.
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4. Selective Contracting
A final cost-containment strategy--one that has worked to an
impressive degree in many contexts-is the practice of denying plan
subscribers the freedom to choose any provider available in the
marketplace. The best known successes with this strategy have
occurred in Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) that employ
closed panels of full-time physicians and undertake contractually to
cover only care rendered by those physicians. 58 Conventional
health insurers and self-insured employers have also reduced costs
somewhat by giving their insureds financial incentives to patronize
so-called "preferred providers"-hospitals and physicians selected by
the plan in part because of their willingness to reduce their charges.
Such plans can also facilitate managed care, designating as preferred
providers only those who agree to cooperate in cost containment.
Indeed, it is only by limiting subscribers' choices and selectively
contracting with providers that financing intermediaries can obtain
competitive prices from providers and their acceptance of any
limitations on their spending freedom.
Although HMOs and other choice-limiting plans can be effective
economizers, they share the fundamental handicaps of managed
care when it comes to letting cost considerations dictate that some
medical risks should be run. Because the law of medical malprac-
tice governs providers in HMOs, they face possible legal liability if
they depart from the costly practice standards customary in the
insured-fee-for-service sector. Although it can be argued that
physicians in HMOs constitute a so-called "respectable minority" of
the profession and therefore should be deemed to set their own
standard of care,59 even this theory exposes innovators who depart
from dominant medical practice to serious legal risks until such
time as others follow their lead. In any event, courts and juries
cannot be counted upon to be forgiving in specific cases. Indeed,
HMOs and their physicians may feel themselves especially vulnera-
ble to criticism for even seeming to economize by putting a patient
at risk.60 In light of this vulnerability, they may hesitate to offer
58 On the procompetitive benefits of allowing restrictions on consumers' freedom
to choose a provider, see Charles D. Weller, "Free Choice' as a Restraint of Trade in
American Health Care Delivery and Insurance, 69 IowA L. REv. 1351, 1375-92 (1984).
59 See Bovbjerg, supra note 54, at 1385.
6 There are occasional suits alleging negligent underservice by HMO physicians
or challenging HMO inducements to their physicians to economize. See, e.g., Madsen
v. Park Nicollet Med. Ctr., 419 N.W.2d 511, 515 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (excluding,
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efficiency defenses in litigation and may tend toward conservatism
rather than aggressiveness in their economizing. Lacking freedom
to contract for an alternative legal regime under which to serve
their subscribers, 61 so-called "alternative delivery systems" are not
offering consumers a full range of economizing options.
Contracts requiring insured consumers to obtain covered care
only from plan-designated providers do have some significant legal
advantages over contractual restrictions on the specific services that
the plan will pay for. They are unambiguous, easily administrable,
and comprehensible to patients. On their face, at least, they are
noncontroversial, because they do not purport to affect the quality
or quantity of care a patient will receive. 62 In addition, because
providers are beholden to the plan for supplying them with patients,
there is little likelihood that the plan will end up (as third-party
payers regularly do) in an open coverage dispute in which the
prescribing doctor actively backs the patient's claim to costly
treatment. Although coverage disputes still arise, 63 HMOs and
as prejudicial, evidence of incentive arrangement in HMO); Pulvers v. Kaiser Found.
Health Plan, 160 Cal. Rptr. 392, 393-94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (unsuccessful challenge
to plan's incentive arrangements); see also BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW:
CASES, MATERIALS & PROBLEMS 719-22 (2d ed. 1991) (listing unreported cases).
Protection against publicity and jury overreaction to HMO economizing efforts in
malpractice suits might be obtained by providing, by contract, for alternative dispute
resolution. See, e.g., Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d 1178 (Cal. 1976)
(leading case upholding contractual requirement to arbitrate future malpractice
claims). To the extent that the plan relies on its contractual authority to economize
in particular respects, alternative dispute resolution offers an opportunity to find
arbiters committed to objective reading of the contract.
61 Private contract has been proposed as a possible vehicle for reforming medical
malpractice law both in general and as it impacts on HMOs. See, e.g., Richard A.
Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 87;
Clark C. Havighurst, Private Reform of Tort-Law Dogma: Market Opportunities and Legal
Obstacles, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 143; Clark C. Havighurst, Altering
the Applicable Standard of Care, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 1, 143-303
[hereinafter Havighurst, Altering the Applicable Standard] (suggesting contractual
language by which an HMO might escape being bound by customary practice). See
generally Symposium, Medical Malpractice: Can the Private Sector Find Relief., LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 1, 143-303. See also infra text accompanying notes
90-101.
62 Compare Madden, 552 P.2d 1178, in which the court, in upholding an
arbitration clause in an HMO contract, stressed that the clause "does not detract from
Kaiser's duty to use reasonable care in treating patients, nor limit its liability for
breach of this duty." Id. at 1186. As a practical matter, however, changing the forum
in which negligence is evaluated could affect the duties to which plan providers are
actually held.
6 Like health insurance policies, HMO contracts typically exclude certain
procedures, including "experimental" therapies.
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other closed-panel plans achieve most of their efficiencies by
involving physicians directly in the cost-containment effort,
obviating the need for explicit contractual limitations on patient
entitlements. 
64
A central feature of closed-panel plans-striking because it is not
more controversial outside the medical profession-is that the
physicians they select typically provide fewer services than other
physicians. Indeed, providers are usually selected or retained partly
on the basis of their spending habits, not just their professional
skills. In addition, plans often give them special incentives to
economize or subject them to internal managed-care procedures or
other supervision. 65  Because such plans work primarily by co-
opting or controlling the medical professionals making treatment
choices, the economizing they achieve usually reflects the rationing
of care itself, not just the availability of financing. 66  One also
looks in vain in the HMO contract for any acknowledgment that
plan physicians may actively ration care or depart from conventional
modes of practice. 67 In comparison with the ideal of prospective
64 There is evidence that the more tightly-knit group-practice and staff-model
HMOs are more successful in controlling utilization than are looser arrangements,
such as individual practice associations (IPAs). The difficulty may be that IPAs "must
rely more heavily upon formal processes, meetings, and rules." Thomas Palay,
Organizing an HMO by Contract: Some Transaction Cost Considerations, 65 NEB. L. REv.
728, 746 (1986). Palay suggests, with some cogency, that administrative or transaction
costs may prevent contractual specification from ever working as well as organization-
al innovations in controlling provider behavior. The question raised in the instant
Article, however, is whether the observed inadequacies of private contract in this field
are all inherent in the vehicle itself. It is at least possible that innovative contracting
has been inhibited by a variety of factors, including the threat of opportunistic
intervention by the legal system, activated by plaintiffs' lawyers, whenever explicit
language is relied upon to accomplish economizing objectives.
65 For observations on the ethics of some managed-care arrangements in HMOs,
see Robert A. Berenson, Hidden Compromises in PayingPhysicians, Bus. & HEALTH,July
1987, at 18; Alan L. Hillman, Financial Incentives for Physicians in HMOs: Is There a
Conflict of Interest?, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1743 (1987) (with accompanying
commentary). Congressional concerns about incentives in HMOs were finally
resolved in 1989 amendments to the provisions allowing Medicare and Medicaid
beneficiaries to enroll in HMOs at public expense. OBRA 1990, Pub. L. 101-508, 104
Stat. 1388-108-09, §4204, amending §1876(i) of the Social Security Act, to be
codified in 42 U.S.C. §1395mm(i) (HMO enrolling public beneficiaries required to
satisfy the Secretary that its incentive arrangements are reasonable).
6 Indeed, it is very rare for a service such as a marginally helpful diagnostic test
or an added hospital day to be withheld from an HMO patient as a covered service
but made available to him on an optional, fee-for-service basis. This interesting
circumstance reflects the HMO's conception of itself as an integrated system
committed to offering an alternative, but still physician-developed, style of care.
67 Cf Havighurst, Altering the Applicable Standard, supra note 61, at 271-72
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self-denial-that is, consensual economizing in accordance with a
written insurance contract-, the strategy of limiting consumers' free
choice of physician should raise some ethical eyebrows.
68
It is thus anomalous that closed-panel plans encounter fewer
legal obstacles than plans that seek to obtain from consumers
express contractual authority for their economizing efforts. Indeed,
there is a potentially illuminating irony here: Explicit, consensual
limitations on the future availability of health care financing may be
less viable legally than true rationing of medical care that is
undertaken by providers sub rosa, under payer-imposed induce-
ments, and without the consumer/patient's consent (except insofar
as consent is signified by voluntary enrollment, with limited
information, in the plan). It is worth asking rhetorically why, in
view of the nonconsensual character of the economizing in which
they engage, HMOs and other closed-panel plans are so popular
with some policy analysts and why there is not more interest in
making private contract an effective vehicle by which consumers,
instead of merely entrusting themselves to plan-selected providers,
can specify some actual preferences with respect to their future
care.
69
(suggesting contractual language to this effect).
Lest these observations concerning HMOs seem too critical or negative, see
Clark C. Havighurst, Health Maintenance Organizations and the Market for Health
Services, 35 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 716 (1970) (representative early expression of
the author's strong support for HMOs, despite incentive problems, as a competitive
alternative to insured fee-for-service medicine). Although the ethical issues are real,
they are not decisive, particularly in view of the experience of many HMOs in giving
excellent value for the consumer's dollar. See HAROLD S. LUFT, HEALTH MAINTE-
NANCE ORGANIZATIONS: DIMENSIONS OF PERFORMANCE 386-406 (1981); Willard G.
Manning et al., A Controlled Trial of the Effect of a Prepaid Group Practice on Use of
Services, 310 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1505 (1984); see also PAUL T. MENZEL, MEDICAL COSTS,
MORAL CHOICES: A PHILOSOPHY OF HEALTH CARE ECONOMICS IN AMERICA 144-48
(1983) (offering a favorable ethical appraisal, premised on choice and implied
consent). But fee-for-service insurance has significant ethical attractions, and it would
be a grave oversight not to encourage any innovations in its administration that can
keep it competitive (even at a higher price).
9 See Havighurst, Decentralizing Decision Making, supra note 4, at 38-39 ("A truly
competitive market that is responsive to consumers' individual concerns and
circumstances cannot be said to exist if HMOs represent the only economizing option
and if the fee-for-service sector must continue to operate, however clumsily, [under
standards prescribed by the courts].").
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C. Improving the Legal Environment for Innovative
Contracting for Health Care Financing
The notable absence of radical redefinitions of patient entitle-
ments in private contracts for health care financing may, of course,
be wholly explainable by purely practical, not legal, consider-
ations.70 Nevertheless, it is also possible that innovation has been
discouraged by a legal regime that is unduly hostile to precisely the
kinds of innovation that efficiency requires. Before it can be
assumed that financing intermediaries are already doing every
feasible and efficient thing to mitigate the moral hazard problem,
it must be clear that the legal system would pose no undue obstacles
to responsibly developed contracts-however controversial-by which
members of insured groups mutually waive future coverage of
particular services.
Prescribing an appropriate stance for courts to take in interpret-
ing health care contracts is not difficult. To avoid effectively
eliminating them as potential vehicles for addressing the myriad
trade-offs in medical care, courts should construe objectively health
insurance contracts that can reasonably be viewed as mutual
covenants of the insureds. 71 In such cases, instead of seizing upon
70 For a full review of factors discouraging insurer cost-containment initiatives, see
Clark C. Havighurst, The Questionable Cost-Containment Record of Commercial Health
Insurers, in HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA: THE PoLmcAL ECONOMY OF HOsPITALs AND
HEALTH INSURANCE 221 (H.E. Frech ed., 1988);Jon R. Gabel & Alan C. Monheit, Will
Competition Plans Change Insurer-ProviderRelatonships?, 61 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND
Q. 614, 626-29 (1983). In addition to facing the practical problems of drafting and
administering innovative contracts, see infra text accompanying notes 90-109, an
individual insurer will have no interest in investing in costly initiatives that are
especially risky (legally or otherwise) for the first mover or easily imitated by
competitors if they succeed. See Havighurst, supra, at 239 (noting that "free-rider and
public-good problems preclude innovators from recouping the costs of desirable
innovations," thus discouraging insurers from undertaking them). Other obstacles
to contractual innovation are noted at other points. State insurance regulation, which
imposes varying (though not disabling) degrees of supervision on modifications of
group insurance policies, has not been specifically investigated.
7FThe specific problem with conventional methods of interpreting health
insurance contracts is their effect on innovation and the cost of coverage. For an
exhaustive theoretical exposition of the general problem of contract interpretation
that is pregnant with significance for the reading of health insurance policies, see
David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation,
89 MICH. L. REv. 1815 (1991). For example, Charny has this to say concerning the
doctrine of contra roferentum:
The contra proferentum rule is highly wasteful because it forces parties
constantly to revise terms to override judicial rulings that are overly
protective of the nonproferring parties. In addition, the rule makes it
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ambiguity as an excuse for extending the policy's coverage, courts
should make allowances for the difficulties facing policy drafters.
72
Specifically, they should respect responsible efforts to customize
coverage by employing unconventional contract terms in the
interest of economizing. In general, they should attempt to give
effect to whatever economizing impulse-greater or lesser-they can
detect in an overall contract scheme.73 A court should, for
example, honor a clause expressly waiving the insured's right to
have the policy construed liberally under the principle of contra
proferentum.
Although health insurers seeking to assist consumers in
economizing on medical care should have their contractual
harder for parties to adopt innovative contract terms, for an innovative term
will leave the parties uncertain about what "ambiguities" courts will find to
resolve against the drafter.
Nor can the contraproferentum rule redistribute between the proffering
and nonproffering parties [citing Kennedy, Redistributive and Paternalist
Motives in Contract and Tort Law, With Special Reference to Compulsoy Terms
and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. Rzv. 563, 609 (1983) (describing
purported redistributive effect of contraproferentum rules)]. The proffering
party that recognizes that the contra proferentum rule will be applied in
various contingencies not clearly covered by express contract language will
simply "price" the probability of such contingencies ....
Id. at 1854-55 (footnotes omitted).
Given the need to facilitate innovation in contracting for prepaid medical care,
objective interpretation of the contract may be appropriate only where unconvention-
al coverage has been elected and there is some sign that the insureds and their agents
were aware of the effort to design less costly (i.e., riskier) coverage. Contrary to their
present impulse in such cases, courts should resist the temptation to find an
innovative economizing contract ambiguous and should instead strive for an objective
interpretation with a view to ascertaining and enforcing the drafters' probable
intentions.
72 "The interpreter must first determine whether subsequent transactors will be
in a position to bargain around the interpretation that it will proffer. This is a crucial
yet generally ignored first step to choosing the method of interpretation." Charny,
supra note 71, at 1877.
73 The conventional, anti-insurer approach to construing insurance contracts
seems never to ask whether insurance for the particular risk was intentionally
purchased or whether, from objective evidence of their preferences, it would have
been a logical insurance buy for the particular insured group. Under the alternative
paradigm of the health insurance policy, a court faced with an ambiguity would
attempt to ascertain what choice the insured group would probably have made. Clues
could be found, for example, in the attitude evinced toward similar risks elsewhere
in the contract. As suggested by Charny, because broad coverage terms are easier to
write than well-defined narrow coverage, courts should strive to give due, not narrow,
effect to any responsible effort to economize by closely specifying limitations. "The
court should consider the costs that future parties will incur in bargaining around the
rule." Id. at 1878.
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limitations on coverage objectively construed, the law should
continue to require that they be candid concerning the limits of the
coverage they are selling, holding them liable when they misrepre-
sent it.74 The insured's "reasonable expectations" should have no
other bearing on a coverage dispute, however. Indeed, the whole
point of having contracts specify coverage is to create opportunities
for payers to offer, and for consumers to buy, insurance that stops
short of covering everything that doctors order in good faith or
everything that patients have become accustomed to having insurers
pay for. Patients, unfortunately, have developed a pervasive
entitlement mentality about health care. Indeed, it is their
"reasonable expectations" that, more than anything else, explain
why the nation spends too much on mainstream health care for the
majority and too little on other things. For courts either to adopt
this mentality themselves 75 or to derive from it a presumption of
coverage that the drafters and marketers of the insurance policy
must affirmatively overcome would severely chill much responsible
economizing.
Another question concerns the amenability of private payers and
health plans to tort actions for bad faith in resisting the payment of
claims. Although such actions could serve a useful function in
keeping payers honest in their dealings with patients, there is
currently a danger that fear of juror and judicial misunderstanding
or hostility, premised on the conventional paradigm of the health
insurance contract, will deter insurers from performing the dirty
work of protecting the insurance fund. Thus, it would be a grave
74 See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 24, § 6.5; Abraham, supra note 25, at 1152-57.
A realistic disclosure requirement would encourage the education of consumers to
the existence of trade-offs and would create opportunities for questions concerning
the appropriateness of the limits adopted and for refinements taking better account
of group preferences.
" In the famous and controversial case of Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash.
1974), the court held it negligent for ophthalmologists to adhere to their specialty's
custom of not testing younger patients for glaucoma. Because the test in question
was one that was not normally covered by insurance, its nonuse might have been
deemed market evidence that it was not generally worth its cost. Although the case
is normally viewed as holding physicians to ajudge-made standard of care, it can also
be viewed as holding them to the more general, insurance-induced standard that
prevails throughout most of medical practice-namely, a requirement that everything
beneficial be done without regard to cost considerations. Although aberrant in its
main thrust, the Helling case is a typical instance of judicial regulation compelling
providers to offer, and consumers to buy, whatever cannot be omitted without some
arguable risk. In Helling, conventional expectations, inspired in the first instance by
no-questions-asked insurance coverage, were extended even to self-financed care.
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error to enact proposed legislation to reintroduce this remedy
against ERISA plans. 76  There is inadequate evidence at the
moment that courts accept the basic legitimacy of insurers' cost-
containment measures introduced ex ante or are realistic concerning
attempts by insurers to enforce them ex post. Given the need for
insurers to engage the cost problem in territory that is far more
treacherous than any they have yet entered, they need to be spared
the risk of misdirected juror anger. They should, however, be held
to reasonable standards of care in administering their coverage in
individual cases.
77
The willingness of a court to construe an innovative health care
financing contract objectively will turn in large measure on the
success of advocates in presenting the contract as, in substance, a
covenant among the insureds-or at least as an agreement that was
negotiated on behalf of the plaintiff patient and benefitted that
patient ex ante. To overcome the conventional paradigm, it can be
argued with some force that payers are ultimately accountable to
consumers and their agents in the marketplace. 78 Some critics
76 See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
77 For a useful discussion of cases involving coverage disputes that takes particular
note of whether the defendant insurer conscientiously used fair procedures, see
Gosfield, supra note 18, at 194-211 (noting that coverage is likely to be found where
procedures were inadequate). It is a different (and vexing) question when
consequential damages should be available for injuries allegedly incurred by a patient
as a result of negligence in refusing to authorize payment for a particular service. Cf.
note 32 supra. Insurer or reviewer liability in such cases would be more akin to
products liability than to liability for medical malpractice. The issue would be care
in the administration of the contract, not professional judgment, and the procedural
duty owed the patient should be ascertained from the contract, not by letting a fact-
finder apply some general reasonableness test. Cases under ERISA suggest that trust-
law principles might come into play. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
It would appear that there are interesting opportunities here for using contracts to
specify patient procedural rights and to introduce alternative dispute-resolution
techniques and (one- or two-way) attorney-fee shifting to improve the efficiency and
reliability with which inevitable disputes are handled.
78 In an antitrust case in which a question of dental insurers' reliability had been
raised, the Supreme Court said:
Insurers deciding what level of care to pay for are not themselves the
recipients of those services, but it is by no means clear that they lack
incentives to consider the welfare of the patient as well as the minimization
of costs. They are themselves in competition for the patronage of the
patients-or, in most cases, the unions or businesses that contract on their
behalf for group insurance coverage-and must satisfy their potential
customers not only that they will provide coverage at a reasonable cost, but
also that coverage will be adequate to meet their customers' dental needs.
FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 463 (1986).
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would object, however, that such accountability as exists does not
ensure that the choices made express the preferences of the
individual consumer.79  Nevertheless, this objection is highly
unrealistic, given the need for collective choice in any financing
program. It is also disingenuous, since the only alternative
consumers have is to accept collective choices made for them at
some even more aggregated level-by persons who are even less
accountable to them and less attuned to their individual interests.
As a general rule, the adverse effects of collective choice on
individuals will be less pronounced in a decentralized system in
which the groups making cost-conscious choices are relatively
homogeneous and in which some individual choice can be pre-
served-by such means as multiple options in the choice of a plan,
well-designed cost sharing, and preferred-provider arrangements.
For courts to insist on perfect consumer knowledge, perfect
accountability of payers and agents, and fully individualized choice
as prerequisites of an enforceable contract for private health
coverage8 0 would effectively destroy private contract as a vehicle
79 E.g., Maxwell J. Mehlman, Fiduciaiy Contracting Limitations on Bargaining
Between Patients and Health Care Providers, 51 U. PrIT. L. REv. 365, 406-09 (1990).80 A possible obstacle in getting legal and medical observers to accept complex
contract terms as binding on individual patients in subsequent medical encounters is
the legal and ethical doctrine of informed consent. Under this doctrine, a physician
is required to include the patient in the loop in making specific decisions regarding
his treatment and to make a real effort to give the patient information relevant to his
choice. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 502
P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972); 1 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MED. AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE
DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE
PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP (1982); F. RosovsKY, INFORMED CONSENT: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE (2d ed. 1992). Obviously, the standard of informed consent could
never be metin any insurance contract-if onlybecause the patient does not yet know
what disease he is likely to have in the future and cannot fully inform himself on all
the possible exigencies he might encounter. But informed consent principles were
developed to protect important dignitary interests of patients and ethical values in
doctor/patient relationships, not to accomplish the impossible task of making every
patient a truly informed, technically competent decision maker. Such principles
should therefore be irrelevant, as such, in assessing insurance contracts. On the other
hand, by vindicating the freedom and right of patients to choose for themselves, the
law of informed consent empowers patients against a professional elite systematically
disposed to view them as too ignorant to be allowed to decline professional
ministrations. It would be regrettable ifjudges-another professional elite-were to
seize on consumers' presumed ignorance in purchasing health coverage as a blanket
excuse for shutting down contract as a vehicle of change. For an example of how far
such consumer-disabling legal thinking can go, see Mehlman, supra note 79, which
would "require the better informed party to disclose its superior information," id. at
416-a requirement under which Mehlman would invalidate even the eminently
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for curbing moral hazard in the interest of the very insureds whose
interests the legal system purports to protect.
Before viewing a health insurance contract under the alternative
paradigm, a court might wish to satisfy itself that the insurer or
employer did not act irresponsibly in designing or administering
innovative coverage. Thus, it might consider whether the drafters
consulted with objective sources and medical experts, expressly
considered trade-offs from a consumer perspective, and disclosed
the economizing nature of the exercise to the insureds and anyone
acting on their behalf. It might also credit an insurer's reliance on
objective medical advice in implementing exclusions from coverage,
its willingness to consult with the treating doctor in difficult cases,
and its use of reasonable procedures for finally resolving close
questions.8 ' If a court could be satisfied on these scores, there is
every likelihood that health care "rationing" that accorded reason-
ably with contractual language would be permitted to proceed.
Instead of counting on the courts to be reasonable, however,
some advocates of innovative contracting might favor seeking
legislation to smooth the way for it. But any approach to the
legislature would open the door for special interests and adherents
of the old paradigm of the health insurance contract to introduce
burdensome statutory preconditions to, and limitations on,
contractual reforms, inevitably undercutting the effort to make
payers primarily accountable to consumers, not to government. The
payers themselves, under their lawyers' influence, would seek highly
specified "safe harbors" against legal attack-under which they would
concentrate on satisfying statutory requirements, not on giving
consumers true choices. The alternative of leaving insurers and
reasonable result in the Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d 1178 (Cal. 1976),
see supra note 60, because he did not deem the individual interests of the plaintiff to
have been adequately represented by her employer in bargaining for the arbitration
clause and because the plan did not succeed in independently making the plaintiff
aware of what her agent had agreed to on her behalf. See Mehlman supra note 79, at
406-09.
In some respects, the emerging law on advance directives concerning patient care
when the patient is no longer able to make choices is more relevant to the issues
under discussion here. Courts and public policy are increasingly receptive to
prospective self-denial in this area. See, e.g., the Patient Self Determination Act,
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat.
1388-108.09, §4206 (1990). By extension, consumers should be free to accept some
limitations on their claims on insurance funds as a way of economizing in the
purchase of health insurance.
81 See supra note 77.
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employers with some responsibility for demonstrating to courts the
conscientiousness with which they conceived and introduced their
innovations would probably give consumers more real protection
than they would get under legislative prescriptions of contracting
rules and minimum benefit packages.8 2 Only if the courts are
finally shown to be truly recalcitrant, frustrating desirable consumer-
oriented innovations, should legislative authority for innovative
contracting be sought.
II. NONLEGAL OBSTACLES TO ECONOMIZING INNOVATIONS
IN HEALTH CARE CONTRACTS
Although aggressive rationing of marginally beneficial health
services is essential to reduce a serious misallocation of the nation's
resources, it faces major cultural, political, and professional
obstacles. Given the difficulty of overcoming deeply entrenched
interests and values by political means, it is worth considering very
seriously whether private contracts, although underutilized in the
past, are not, after all, the most promising and ethically attractive
vehicles available in the American context for introducing benefit!
cost trade-offs into medical decisions. Despite its special costs
8 3
82 See Havighurst, Decentralizing Decision Making, supra note 4:
To the extent that the law does pose problems for employers, HMOs, and
insurers seeking to implement such changes, it promises to move them in
directions [e.g., disclosure, consumer education, etc.] that are entirely
compatible with the competition strategy, and to be helpful both in
clarifying and expanding consumer choices and in protecting consumers
against abuse and unwarranted hardship.
Id. at 42. Well advised insurers and employers would adopt their innovations in ways
that demonstrate the legitimacy and conscientiousness of their effort. Courts,
however, should not go nearly as far in regulating or second-guessing the initiators
of reforms as Mehlman, writing about something called "fiduciary contracting,"
suggests. See Mehlman, supra note 79 (discussed supra note 80).
3 Complaints have been voiced recently about the allegedly excessive administra-
tive costs of private health care financing. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
CANADIAN HEALTH INSURANCE: LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES (1991); Steffie
Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, The DeterioratingAdministrative Efficiency of the
U.S. Health Care System, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1253 (1991). Because of ubiquitous
moral hazard, however, some administrative burden is inevitable in any scheme for
protecting individuals against unpredictable or unaffordable health care costs.
Whether administrative costs are excessive depends upon whether, at the margin, they
exceed controllable waste. See supra note 6.
The operation of free markets always entails some special costs and duplication
of effort. Marketing, search, and other transaction costs are usually justified,
however, by the benefits that flow to consumers from continual innovation, the
diversity of products produced, and the desirable incentives that result from making
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and the inevitable shakiness of any institution's claim of moral
authority to undertake explicit health care rationing,84 private
contract may be one of those democratic, choice-based institutions
that is unsatisfactory only as long as it is not objectively and
realistically compared to its freedom-limiting alternatives.
Those who resist allowing private contract to become a potent
vehicle of change in the health care sector cannot deny the force of
contract's claim to legitimacy.8 5 They seek to deny that claim,
however, by asserting, essentially, that freedom of contract is
illusory and that honoring it allows the strong systematically to
overreach the weak. Yet, ironically, the market and the courts
impose upon employers and payers a great deal more accountability
to consumers than is imposed upon the academic critics and judges
who pronounce so assuredly on what rights consumers should have.
Moreover, the political process, on which critics would also rely for
difficult choices, is much more adept at conferring power on a
political/legal/academic elite than at translating the preferences of
individual consumer/voters into responsive action. It is worth
remembering that critics who purport to view private contract only
as a weapon of the powerful are members of the so-called "new
class," whose own power and influence would diminish if rights
were specified in private contracts rather than by the legal sys-
tem.
8 6
The facial legitimacy and relative ethical attractiveness of
contracts providing for prospective self-denial are sufficient reasons
to explore the prospects for developing such contracts and for
overcoming the obstacles to their widespread and effective use.
There are, to begin with, obvious practical questions concerning the
sellers accountable for the quality and cost of their products in the marketplace. The
health policy issue is simply whether consumers get, or might get, sufficient similar
benefits in return for whatever additional costs they bear by having private
intermediaries rather than a government monopoly pay for their health care. See
Havighurst, Why Preserve Private Financing., supra note 4 (addressing the importance
of having a diversity of products available and noting constraints on the offering of
a full range of choice).
84 See generally MENZEL, supra note 19.
85 See, e.g., Mehlman, supra note 79, at 365 ("Chicago School theorists wield a
formidable weapon in the theory of contract.").
86 On the "new dass" and its self-serving antimarket ideology, see HANSFRIED
KELLNER & FRANK W. HEUBERGER, HIDDEN TEGHNOcRATs: THE NEW CLASS AND NEW
CAPITALISM (1991); IRVING KRISTOL, Two CHEERS FOR CAPITALISM 27-31 (1978), and
Paul H. Weaver, Regulation, Social Policy, and Class Conflict, PUB. INTEREST, Winter
1978, at 45.
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capacity of contract drafters to articulate, ex ante, reasonable
rationing schemes to which consumers might fairly be said, ex post,
to have consented. If one finds that significantly better private
rationing rules could in fact be written, there is then the question
how well a system tolerating their use would perform in practice.
This empirical question cannot be answered, however, because
serious experiments using private contracts to introduce benefit/
cost trade-offs into medical decisions are, for the vast majority of
people, simply unthinkable. This intellectual blind spot in the
conventional wisdom may be the most severe obstacle to anyone's
embarking on the prodigious effort needed to put the idea of
aggressive, contract-based rationing to a fair market test. The legal
environment for innovative contracting, while not inviting, is not
finally prohibitive; a policy-aware insurance lawyer should be able
to persuade most courts of the validity of prospective self-denial in
a given case-if those who wrote, marketed, and administered the
contracts did their jobs with care.
A. Finding New Ways to Specify Entitlements and Obligations
The market failure that causes resources to be overinvested in
health care has only rarely been attributed specifically to contract
failure-that is, to the inability of drafters of insurance contracts to
specify with the requisite precision just what services the insured
group wishes (and does not wish) to purchase from health care
providers on a prepaid basis.8 7 Analysts have instead focused most
of the blame for runaway health care costs on third-party payment
operating in conjunction with provider ingenuity and consumer
ignorance. Only a few have observed that increased costs attribut-
able to insurance-induced moral hazard are an acceptable cost of
needed financial protection-as long as payers take all feasible, cost-
effective actions to offset that inefficiency.88  Unfortunately,
however, earlier discussion has shown how insurer cost-containment
efforts are themselves severely hampered by the difficulty of
articulating clear, enforceable contract rules to govern spending in
each doctor/patient encounter. Even HMOs confront such
87 Contract failure is characteristic of any profession, such as medicine. Indeed,
it has been suggested that a profession can best be distinguished from other service
occupations by "reference to the ease or difficulty of precisely specifying a provider's
performance obligations in advance of the provision of services." Havighurst, Altering
the Applicable Standard, supra note 61, at 265.
88See supra note 6.
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specification problems. Although not all HMOs need explicit
internal rules to govern the clinical practices of their physicians,
89
the general inability of HMOs to write contracts closely specifying
their physicians' legal obligations to subscribers in specific clinical
situations creates malpractice liability risks that preclude much
desirable economizing.
Contract drafters initially responded to the difficulty of
specifying payer and provider obligations to patients, not by making
each contract the equivalent of a customized medical textbook, but
by incorporating in the contract, by explicit or implicit reference,
the norms and standards of the medical profession. Thus, payers
undertook to pay for whatever care was "medically necessary," and
physician/patient relationships were established on the assumption
that care would not fall below professional standards. Although
borrowing standards observable in the marketplace originally made
good practical sense,90 general use of this expedient in conjunc-
tion with third-party payment dramatically weakened the market's
usual constraints on spending. With those on the demand side of
the market unable to communicate their priorities to the supply
side, the medical profession became virtually the sole arbiter of
what consumers would pay for through cost-spreading insurance
mechanisms. The legal system, by unquestioningly accepting
professional norms and standards as its touchstones in defining
payer and provider obligations, added its own compulsions to the
other cost-escalating incentives bearing on providers. With private
contract unable to play its usual central role in specifying buyer/
seller obligations, the legal system moved into the vacuum, assuming
its now dominant role in specifying relationships.
Although physicians and payers should be bound by reasonable
professional standards in the absence of any clearly articulated
alternative standard, private health plans should not be denied
opportunities to redefine provider and payer obligations contractu-
89 See supra note 64.
90 On the efficiency of having reference to professional standards in private
contracts, see Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice, Imperfect Information, and the
Contractual Foundation for Medical Services, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs., Spring 1986, at
201; Havighurst, Altering the Applicable Standard, supra note 61, at 266-72. Note that
the efficiency explanation for why professional standards were adopted in the first
place undercuts any claim that such standards are superior, for any specific purpose,
to any other standards that may subsequently appear. Precisely because such
standards were adopted by default and not by choice, courts should be open-minded,
not suspicious, if consumers and their agents attempt to implement a different
standard.
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ally. Thus, the question arises whether there is any reason to think,
at the present juncture, that private health care contracts could, as
a purely practical matter, perform a substantially expanded function
in specifying and limiting patient entitlements and payer and
provider obligations. Is there any practical yet still untried way in
which consumers and their agents might effectively authorize
providers to economize by omitting services of doubtful value if
those services seem mandated by professional norms? Obviously, it
is premature to worry about the receptiveness of the legal system to
innovative contracts responding sensitively to consumers' economiz-
ing needs if there is in fact no realistic basis for believing that such
contracts are feasible.
One untried set of feasible contractual innovations are voluntary
agreements limiting the tort-law rights of plan subscribers. 91 Many
malpractice reforms that might be adopted privately--for example,
limits on the kinds and amounts of recoverable damages-have
precedents in reforms that have been widely adopted by state
legislatures. 92 Although one would expect voluntary reforms to
fare better in the courts than government-imposed alterations in
patient rights, lawyers tend to be doubtful about letting people
redesign their own rights by any means-especially where they sense
an effort to economize on legal services." Nevertheless, even
91 See supra note 61. Although lawyers are skeptical about the enforceability of
such contracts, the cases that arouse their skepticism have uniformly involved pure
exculpatory clauses and the like-not well crafted modifications of legal rights of the
kind contemplated here. See Emory Univ. v. Porubiansky, 282 S.E.2d 903 (Ga. 1981);
Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963). For an anticontract-
arian effort to extrapolate from these and other narrow holdings principles that
would bar virtually any private reform of malpractice rights, see Mehlman, supra note
79.
92 See e.g., PAUL C. WE.LER MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 19-69 (1991) ; Glen
0. Robinson, The Malpractice Crisis of the 1970's: A Retrospective, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 1986, at 5. The constitutionality of such statutory reforms has been
widely litigated because of their mandatory character and the concern that they were
enacted only to serve provider interests. See HAVIGHURST, supra note 45, at 704-47;
David R. Smith, Battling a Receding Tort Frontier: Constitutional Attacks on Medical
Malpractice Laws, 38 OKLA. L. REv. 195 (1985).
1 For academic objections to private reform of malpractice law, exaggerating the
risks and barely acknowledging any cost-saving benefits from diminishing the role of
courts and lawyers, see Sylvia A. Law, A Consumer Perspective on Medical Malpractice,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 305, 316-18 ("Patients have little capacity
to make informedjudgments about cost and quality trade-offs"); Mehlman, supra note
79 (discussed supra note 80); see also P.S. Atiyah, Medical Malpractice and the Contract!
Tort Boundaty, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 287, 302 (accepting
contractual reform of malpractice rights only after concluding "at the end of the day"
that legislative reform strategies are likely to fail in the U.S. political system) and
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given an overweening legal culture distrustful of private choices,
enforcement of innovative contracts should be obtainable by skillful
advocacy, preceded by care in drafting and by consumer education
in marketing. Private health plans should therefore be alert for
opportunities to assist consumers in economizing by surrendering
legal rights that systematically induce or excuse excessive spending
by physicians. 94 Although contracts limiting recoverable damages
could lower malpractice insurance premiums and might somewhat
lessen the pressure on physicians to practice defensive medicine, the
net saving to consumers might be too small either to justify the
effort or to offset the dilution of incentives deterring real negli-
gence.9 5 Creative lawyering should therefore be directed instead
to developing and introducing alternative standards for determining
liability.96  Contractual language could, for example, seek to
eliminate the requirement of compliance with professional norms
and standards by generally authorizing departures from custom
which are not unreasonable in benefit/cost terms or which are
warranted by the findings of medical or health services research.
97
Peter A. Bell, Analyzing Tort Law: The Flawed Promise of Neocontract, 74 MINN. L. REV.
1177 (1990) (having little specific reference to malpractice). A major point of the
instant article is that the medical profession alone should not be the final arbiter of
the standards of medical care. Similarly, the legal system's prescriptions of costly tort
rights for patients should yield to consumer choice, reasonably exercised. Seegenerally
sources cited supra note 61.
94 Collective-action and free-rider problems, rather than consumer preferences,
go a long way-together with overcautious lawyering-toward explaining why existing
opportunities of this kind have not been seized. See Havighurst, AlteringtheApplicable
Standard, supra note 61, at 171 n.91. Solutions to these problems are not immediately
in sight, but legislative encouragement or a few well-publicized, easily imitated
successes could induce a flurry of innovation.
95 Real negligence is already underpoliced. See HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE
STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK, at executive summary 6
(1990) (finding that "[a]bout 16 times as many patients suffered an injury from
negligence as received compensation from the tort liability system"). Different
conclusions might be drawn from this fact, however. For example, one might
conclude either that it would be risky to dilute incentives further or that existing
rights provide so little protection (and cost so much to administer) that they can be
curtailed. Or one might choose a totally different approach. See infra text
accompanying notes 100-01.
96 For a legislative proposal expressly inviting contractual innovations of this kind,
see S. 1232, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (introduced by Senator Domenici). See also
Clark C. Havighurst & Thomas B. Metzloff, S. 1232-A Late Entry in the Race for
Malpractice Reform, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1991, at 179. Although the
contemplated contracts would directly affect doctor/patient relationships, it would
be preferable for them to be negotiated by payers, who could capture the cost savings
for consumers.
97 For proposed contractual language by which an HMO might protect its freedom
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Or a contract drafter, observing that general practitioners use
significantly fewer resources than medical specialists in treating
comparable patients, might provide that only the standard of care
prevailing among family physicians in the area would be used in
evaluating the spending choices of all participating physicians,
whatever their specialty, and would be used as well in determining
the plan's payment obligations. 98  Another possible contractual
approach would be to limit patients' right to sue for anything but
gross negligence, suitably defined. 99 Or compensation for injuries
might be based on something other than provider fault.
100
Other promising opportunities for redesigning the contractual
basis of patient/provider/payer relationships may exist in the near
future. Major efforts are currently being made to supply clinicians
and other decision makers, including contract drafters, with better
to depart from customary practice, see Havighurst, Altering the Applicable Standard,
supra note 61, at 271-72.
98 In a recent study, certain subspecialists were found to use more resources in
treating comparable patients than general internists, who in turn used somewhat
more resources than family physicians. See Sheldon Greenfield et al., Variations in
Resource Utilization Among Medical Specialties and Systems of Care, 267 JAMA 1624
(1992). Legally, medical specialists are generally held to the standard of their
specialty, which is viewed on a national basis. See, e.g., Shilkret v. Annapolis
Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 349 A.2d 245, 250-51 (Md. Ct. App. 1975) (reviewing
doctrine). General practitioners, on the other hand, are often evaluated on the basis
of practice in a narrower geographic area. See Annotation, Modem Status of "Locality
Rule" in Malpractice Action Against Physician Who Is Not a Specialist, 99 A.L.R.3d 1133
(1980). It would seem relatively easy for a contract drafter to specify that the latter
standard should govern the obligations of physicians to prescribe extra tests and more
costly treatments and the payment responsibilities of the plan itself. (Physicians
would still be bound to demonstrate the care and skill characteristic of their
respective specialties in carrying out indicated procedures or treatments.) Just as
consumers are free to receive their care from family physicians, they should be free
to choose a health plan that undertakes to economize as they do. It is difficult to see
any basis for ajudicial refusal to give effect to a contract specifying, with adequate
disclosure, such a standard. By such contracts, fee-for-service insurers might be able
to reduce resource use to levels comparable to HMOs, which the Greenfield study,
supra, shows to be independently lower.
See Havighurst, Altering the Applicable Standard, supra note 61, at 273-75 for a
surprisingly persuasive rationale for adopting such a clause.
100 See, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst, "Medical Adversity Insurance"-Has Its Time Come?,
1975 DUKE L.J. 1233; Clark C. Havighurst & Lawrence R. Tancredi, "MedicalAdversity
Insurance'.-A No-Fault Approach to Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 51
MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 125 (1973); Laurence R. Tancredi & Randall R.
Bovbjerg, Rethinking Responsibility for Patient Injury: Accelerated-Compensation Events,
A Malpractice and Quality Reform Ripe for a Test, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring
1991, at 147. See supra note 95 for a reason for shifting to a limited strict-liability
system as a way of lowering claims-resolution costs and getting quality-assurance
incentives right-as these proposals seek to do.
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scientific information on the effectiveness and outcomes of various
courses of diagnosis and treatment. In what could become the most
important health policy development of the 1990s, professional and
other groups are actively developing "practice guidelines," which
define in substantial detail, based on the best scientific learning,
recommended clinical methods to be employed in commonly
encountered situations. 10 1 Although guideline development has
a long way to go, the efforts under way should eventually yield sets
of scientifically grounded, highly specific recommendations for
clinicians to follow.
Practice guidelines have been heralded mostly as a new
generation of professional standards that will improve the regula-
tion of medical practice, including the administration of malpractice
law. 10 2 It is also possible, however, to view them as a new tech-
nology that could enable consumers, for the first time, to choose the
exact style of medical care they wish to purchase on a prepaid
basis.103 For guidelines to serve consumers in this way, there
would have to be more than a single set of professionally promulgat-
ed guidelines expressing a medical consensus or equally approving
a range of acceptable practices. Fortunately, although the guide-
lines movement has some monolithic features, 10 4 it seems likely
in time to yield a variety of guidelines, including alternatives
prepared by experts not accountable to organized medicine. Even
101 See generally AMERICAN MED. ASS'N, LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF PRACTICE
PARAMETERS (1990); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES:
DIRECTIONS FOR A NEW PROGRAM (Marilyn J. Field & Kathleen N. Lohr eds., 1990)
(providing guidelines and examples of good practice guidelines); PHYSICIAN PAYMENT
REvIEW COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 1989, at 219-36 (recommending
federal support for effectiveness research and development of practice guidelines);
Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines for Medical Care: The Policy Rationale, 34 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 777 (1990) (describing guidelines movement and important federal
legislation supporting guideline development); Symposium, Getting It Right: The
Making of Practice Guidelines, 16 QUALITY REv. BULL. 38 (1990); William L. Roper et
al., Effectiveness in Health Care: An Initiative to Evaluate and Improve Medical Practice,
319 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1197 (1988) (proposal by officials of the Health Care Financing
Administration).
102 See Troyen A. Brennan, Practice Guidelines and Malpractice Litigation: Collision
or Cohesion?, 16 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 67 (1991); Mark A. Hall, The Defensive
Effect of Medical Practice Policies in Malpractice Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1991, at 119.
X°See Havighurst, supra note 101, at 792-804; Clark C. Havighurst, Practice
Guidelines as Legal Standards Governing Physician Liability, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1991, at 87.
'o See Havighurst, supra note 101, at 783-92 (discussing the "traditional
professional" and "political" models of practice guidelines).
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if the initial guidelines were produced by professional authorities,
there would be little-at least as a practical matter-to stop other
experts from marking them up, modifying them at crucial points to
reflect cost concerns or different views of the evidence on efficacy
and cost-effectiveness.10 5 Once they could choose from a variety
of practice guidelines, health insurers and other health plans would
finally possess some tools with which to specify the style of medical
care they wish to underwrite. Consumer protection against ill-
conceived guidelines could be provided by public or private
certification programs verifying, not their ultimate merit, but the
objectivity and scientific rigor with which they were prepared.
10 6
Practice guidelines produced by reputable sources taking
different views of the scientific evidence and the benefits and costs
of treatment could easily be incorporated by reference into private
contracts. In contrast to the protocols and screening criteria
currently employed in utilization management, contractual guide-
lines would be disclosed both to consumer representatives and
providers at the outset, would be open to discussion and modifica-
tion as their shortcomings became apparent, and would be readily
accessible through computer technology to guide practice and
resolve issues. Although guidelines could never address all clinical
exigencies or immediately reflect new scientific findings and
technological developments, they would nevertheless greatly
facilitate communication and cooperation between payers and
providers.10 7 Even where they failed to provide for a particular
case, they would serve as helpful reference points for interpolating
coverage and for resolving malpractice claims.
108
105 Some copyright problems might be encountered but should not be insur-
mountable.
106 The federal guidelines program is already charged by Congress in such a way
that it could assume this certification function. See Havighurst, supra note 101, at
804-16.
107 Important insights into how guidelines might work in practice might be gained
by considering them in light of the law and economics literature on transaction costs
and relational contracts. See generally Palay, supra note 64, at 738-46; Oliver E.
Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of ContractualRelations, 22J.L.
& EcON. 233 (1979); I. R. MacNeil, The Many Futures of Contract, 47 S. CAL. L. REV.
691 (1974). These references adopt a more dynamic and contextual view of private
contracts that the simplistic conception of each contract as the embodiment of a
discrete, fully bargained transaction. Progress in making contracts work in medical
care must recognize, as modern scholars are beginning to do, that relationships
cannot be governed by contract language alone and that ambiguity is a common and
inevitable, not an exceptional, circumstance.
108 The Domenici malpractice reform bill expressly invites private and public
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If practice guidelines are developed specifically for, and put to,
such voluntary contractual uses, they will greatly expand the ability
of private financing intermediaries to be selective in the many grey
areas of medical practice and to implement a consistent plan policy
toward risk and cost across the entire range of patients' medical
needs.1 0 9 Specifically, they could be used to fine-tune patient cost
sharing, to make exclusions from coverage less categorical and more
sensitive to medical circumstances, to give providers and utilization
managers objective points of reference in their interactions, and to
insulate participating providers from liability for authorized
economizing. Of course, practice guidelines will never truly solve
all the problems of introducing cost considerations appropriately
into medical decision making. But, with proper encouragement by
government and acceptance by the courts, they could represent a
great leap forward for consumers, empowering them to make
choices they have heretofore been unable to make. In giving private
health plans the means to offer their customers sensitive economiz-
ing with their most essential health needs in view, practice guide-
lines could finally bring cost-conscious consumers and their agents
to the table where crucial, costly medical decisions are made.
B. Needed: A New Paradigm of Medical Care
Unfortunately, the idea that consumers might participate
effectively in decisions to reduce the cost-and perhaps even the
content and quality-of their own health care flies directly in the
face of most thinking about medical care and the directions health
policy should take. The pervasive assumption in public and private
conceptions of medical care is that it could never be a consumer
good, to be purchased in greater or lesser quantities depending
upon its price and made available in the marketplace in a variety of
forms designed to appeal to different preferences and pocketbooks.
Instead, health care is generally thought of as a "merit good"-that
is, as something that should be distributed equitably, not simply
according to ability to pay. To the extent that it has been necessary
health plans to incorporate practice guidelines as standards for determining provider
liability. See Havighurst & Metzloff, supra note 96, at 189-91.
109 Public programs, such as the Medicaid program in Oregon, would likewise
benefit from the enhanced ability of plan designers to reduce the scope of coverage
at points where outcomes are least likely to suffer, avoiding the necessity for lopping
off whole categories of sometimes highly beneficial care. Seesupra text accompanying
notes 45-47.
PROSPECTIVE SELF-DENIAL
under this paradigm of medical care to specify the precise content
of patients' entitlements-as in medical malpractice cases and
insurance coverage disputes-, society has been generally content to
rely in the first instance on the judgment of treating physicians and
ultimately on the collective norms and standards of the medical
profession. Despite their universal use as reference points for
evaluating clinical practices, however, professional norms and
standards have rarely been scrutinized for consistency with the
public interest.110 In a striking reversal of the pattern in normal
demand-driven markets, the health care industry is in the enviable
position of prescribing without appreciable accountability the
quantity and characteristics of the services it renders-and for which
the consuming public must pay.
111
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the conceptions of medical
care as a consumer good and as a merit good are not mutually
exclusive. Redistributive goals could easily be achieved without
depriving medical care of its character as a consumer good at the
margin. For example, a government voucher program could give
everyone the means to purchase adequate health care coverage
while leaving them free, within limits, to decide for themselves
among the styles and standards of service available and whether to
purchase additional services or financial protection at their own
expense. Just as Oregon's Medicaid program is attempting to find
better ways to allocate and supplement the subsidy it gets from the
federal government and to specify new rights for Medicaid benefi-
ciaries, private middlemen might assist both publicly subsidized and
self-supporting groups in defining their future entitlements. As
discussed earlier, changes in the way contract drafters specify
110 Tort-law standards present analogous problems in other contexts. Thus,
products liability forjury-determined design defects may be imposed without regard
to whether all efficient safety measures were taken, and contractual disclaimers of
liability are unlikely to be respected. As a result, some socially desirable products are
kept off the market. See W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore, Rationalizing the
Relationship between Product Liability and Innovation, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 105 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991). In the medical area, the risk is not that
some desirable services will be omitted but that services will be regularly supplied in
quantities and versions that are more costly than is socially appropriate. This results
from the externalization of the costs of treatment through payment systems and the
legal system's borrowing of standards from professional sources.
III Standard setting occurs in other fields as well, and producers run liability risks
in offering lower-cost, substandard alternatives. Nevertheless, medicine is probably
the only standard-setting industry that does not face a downward-sloping demand
curve that significantly limits what it can force the public to accept.
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provider and payer obligations could give consumers a much greater
say over what they are obligating themselves to pay for. If contrac-
tual innovations are developed and implemented with appropriate
care, it should be possible to convince courts that economizing in
the purchase of health care financing is no different than economiz-
ing in any other consumer purchase.
Although contract drafting problems and legal uncertainties still
remain, the chief obstacle to contractual innovations in purchasing
health care is probably the unthinkability under the conventional
wisdom of the entire idea of expanding the role of consumers and
their agents in making trade-offs with respect to medical care. The
main source of the paradigm of medical care portraying it as
something other than an ordinary article of commerce is the
medical profession itself. Physicians strongly believe that the
content of medical care is primarily a technical matter and that its
determination is ultimately a professional responsibility. 112 These
beliefs add up to a powerful ideology that leaves little room for cost
considerations either in individual physicians' clinical decisions or
in collective judgments by professional bodies concerning the
appropriateness of various measures.
113
The medical profession's paradigm of medical decision making
stifles the transmission of cost concerns from the demand side of
the market to the supply side by denying the legitimacy of both the
message and the messengers. Physicians keep cost considerations
subsidiary to questions of safety and efficacy by stressing patient
welfare and the ethical duty of physicians to consider only that in
clinical decisions. Physicians also find it easy to characterize cost-
control efforts by both private and public payers as interference by
uncaring interests in sacred professional relationships. To the
extent that prospective financing of medical care necessitates
bifurcation of the consumer's stake-with health concerns entrusted
112 For a fuller exposition of the professional paradigm of medical care and the
obstacles it poses to a variety of badly needed reforms, see Havighurst, The
Professional Paradigm, supra note 4.
113 For revealing insights into evolving medical thinking, see David M. Eddy, Cost-
effectiveness Analysis: A Conversation with My Father, 267 JAMA 1669 (1992). The
younger Dr. Eddy is an effective leader in the effort to get physicians to accept the
appropriateness of cost considerations in the formulation of clinical policies. One
reason is that he remains true to the professional paradigm. Thus, he frames the
issues as technical ones (with costs to be explicitly factored into calculations) and
emphasizes the need for the profession to reform itself. Although he would tolerate
changes originating on the demand side of the market, he neither welcomes such
diversity nor invites consumers' purchasing agents to force changes on practitioners.
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to physicians and cost concerns entrusted to financing intermediar-
ies-, physicians have the advantage of being on the side of the
angels in most disputes over spending on a particular patient.
1 4
Their paradigm of medical decision making thus carries great
weight in the popular mind. There is little room in the dominant
paradigm of medical care for acknowledging a role for payers as
consumer agents in defining the standard and intensity of the care
they underwrite.
The professional paradigm of medical care also has many points
in common with the egalitarian ideal that underlies much political
thinking about health care. Although the medical profession and
liberal reformers differ on many issues, they are united on the
premise that decision making about medical care should be
centralized, not left in the hands of consumers and their agents. To
be sure, these interests struggle incessantly over who-government
or the profession-should have the ultimate authority to define the
content of medical care and over the propriety of regulatory or
fiscal constraints on clinical practice. Nevertheless, the assumption
that hard economizing choices must be made, if at all, at the level
of the entire society, is very firmly entrenched in the thinking of
both the medical care industry and its most vigorous critics. By thus
denying consumers or government programs any discretion openly
to forgo any beneficial care in the interest of economizing, the
professional/egalitarian conception of medical care contributes to
the current political stalemate in health policy. Because the nation
can neither afford to guarantee state-of-the-art medical care for all
nor bring itself to do any less, it does nothing at all for the mass of
uninsured Americans-a particularly tragic example of how the best
can be the enemy of the good.
115
114 See supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text.
115 There is no sign at the moment that voters will not continue, as they have in
the past, to reject the egalitarians' program, whether pursued by a levelling-up
strategy or by levelling down. As long as voters refuse both to pay taxes to finance
state-of-the-art care for all and to accept rationing of their own care in order to make
care available to others, the needs of the underserved will continue to be neglected.
Because the egalitarians' best hope for achieving their preferred solution lies in
letting the system as a whole deteriorate to a point where radical reform will finally
be possible, many of them tend to oppose incremental reforms that would improve
the existing marketplace by getting incentives right through tax reform, decentralizing
decision making, and makinglow-cost private insurance options available. Under the
resulting political stalemate, the gap between the haves and the have-nots is much
wider than it would be under a regime that conceived of medical care as a consumer
good at the margin while offering subsidies to assist everyone in getting at least basic
care as a merit good. The irony in the political standoff is that those who hold out
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Employers concerned about rising fringe benefit costs would
seem to be the parties most likely to initiate contractual innovations
in the purchasing of health care. Employers are severely limited,
however, in their ability to assist their employees in economizing by
the dominant paradigm of medical care as it persists among the
employees themselves. Health benefits have long symbolized
employers' concern for their workers' welfare, and economizing
moves might easily be misinterpreted as something other than an
effort to make sure that compensation takes the most efficient
forms. Indeed, cutbacks of health benefits have been a common
cause of worker discontent. The dominant paradigm portraying
health care as an entitlement rather than as an object of consumer
choice thus looms large as an obstacle to employers' efforts to carry
the fight against rising costs into the no-man's-land of benefit/cost
trade-offs.11 6 The burden of reeducating consumers about the
nature of health care, together with the other costs of innova-
tion, 117 make it highly unlikely that administrators of existing
employee benefits will be in the forefront in brokering insurance
agreements incorporating the concept of prospective self-denial.
for making health care a uniform entitlement bear much of the blame for the
burdens borne by the uninsured-as their visions of the best frustrate realization of
attainable improvements. See, e.g., Waxman: Reject Oregon Waiver, HEALTH LEGIS. &
REG., Apr. 22, 1992, at 1.
116 An issue for the future is whether health insurance should continue to be
procured as a fringe benefit of employment. This way of providing coverage is largely
an artifact of the tax treatment of insurance premiums and creates significant
problems, particularly with respect to continuity and portability of coverage. An
interesting proposal originating at The Heritage Foundation would break the
employment link and require all individuals, with appropriate public assistance, to
maintain adequate, portable coverage (to offset the temptation for individuals to free-
ride on the health care system's charitable impulses as protection against becoming
sick). See STUART M. BUTLER & EDWARD F. HAISLMAIER, A NATIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM
FOR AMERICA (1989); Stuart M. Butler, A Tax Reform Strategy to Deal with the Uninsured,
265JAMA 2591 (1991). Even without tax incentives to purchase insurance through
the workplace, however, employers would continue to play a large role in making
coverage available, helping employees obtain it at favorable group rates, searching the
market for desirable options, and educating workers to make wise choices. With
employers no longer directly concerned about the cost of coverage and with health
coverage no longer a central symbolic feature of the employer/employee relationship,
insurers would be the main source of innovation in coverage design and would be
more easily perceived as offering contracts designed to serve consumer interests. In
this context, the paradigm of medical care as a consumer good-and as an object of
prospective self-denial-rather than as a centrally determined entitlement would stand
an excellent chance of taking hold.
117 See supra note 94.
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Innovative contracts providing for aggressive rationing of health
care financing might catch on, however, among employers who now
offer no health coverage at all. These employers and their employ-
ees are acutely conscious of the staggering cost of the only health
care options currently available to them-namely, coverage entitling
covered individuals to standard, high-cost, state-of-the-art medical
care. It would seem that the millions of employed persons who are
currently priced out of the market for health insurance should be
positively grateful for new lower-cost options, even if they carry
some risks that other insured persons do not bear. Likewise, the
fiscal problem of caring for the uninsured would seem less over-
whelming to the federal and state governments if health care were
viewed not as an all-or-nothing proposition but as a consumer good
which can be purchased in affordable increments. The economizing
effort under way in Oregon illustrates how, by facing marginal
trade-offs and accepting some rationing of beneficial care, govern-
ment might provide essential health care to all low-income persons.
Nothing would do so much to enable the nation to close the gap
between private coverage and public financing as a reconceptualiza-
tion of medical care as a consumer good rather than as an entitle-
ment to a set of services fixed by central authority. The current
political stalemate reflects, above all, the difficulty under the
dominant paradigm of proceeding incrementally to close the gap in
either direction.
If new, low-cost packages of prepaid health care were to become
available and achieve some acceptance, employers offering health
benefits might then feel comfortable offering such packages to their
employees as options, along with more traditional coverage.
Workers would then have an opportunity to increase their individu-
al welfare by accepting some risk-just as they do, for example, by
purchasing smaller, less safe cars.118 More than anything else,
eye-catching price tags could induce consumers to scrap the
1s Unfortunately, offering choices opens up possibilities for adverse selection.
See supra note 45. Nevertheless, if the low cost of the alternative plan reflects careful
cuts made all along the margin of health care rather than gross categorical exclusions,
the employer should experience less shifting between plans by employees trying to
game the system (or be able counter it by simply excluding treatment of pre-existing
conditions from coverage under a newly selected policy). Although some promoters
of competition in health care markets believe that adverse selection can best be
avoided by establishing a standard benefit package, see, e.g., Enthoven, supra note 45,
at 42 ("I believe there is a strong presumption in favor of standardization."), this
Article suggests that creativity in designing options might achieve even lower costs
without encountering severe adverse selection.
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entitlement paradigm and consider their options.11 9 As consum-
ers wake up to trade-offs and economizing opportunities, courts and
the larger culture might finally accept that in purchasing health
care, as in purchasing other things, choices must be made.
Although individual physicians would remain free to choose the
health plans in which they would participate, the medical profession
as a whole would have no choice but to go along with a new
paradigm of medical care in which consumers ultimately call the
shots.
CONCLUSION
At a recent conference, economist HenryJ. Aaron advanced the
hypothesis that consumer choice serves no very useful purpose when
it comes to private health care financing.1 20 Although not finally
asserting the truth of this proposition, Aaron challenged others to
refute it, and many of the assembled economists, like true believers
defending a central tenet of their faith, undertook to do so.
Certainly, they could argue, the nation benefitted significantly from
consumer choice in the 1980s, when a real choice-driven revolution
occurred in the private purchasing of medical care.121 Indeed, in
that decade, HMOs finally began to grow dramatically; the emer-
gence of selective contracting and preferred-provider arrangements
gave consumers for the first time the benefit of real price competi-
ton among providers; and managed-care mechanisms were
developed to challenge some uneconomic utilization practices in the
fee-for-service sector. Consumer choice, unleashed by antitrust
enforcement and the withdrawal of government as a dominating
regulatory presence, triggered these developments. In response to
Aaron's suggestion that choice and competition are of little use in
119 A major uncertainty is how, given the symbolic significance of health care,
occasional apparent hardships would affect demand for low-cost options. Many of
these hardships would be more apparent than real, of course, because of the patient's
poor prognosis or quality of life even with a costlier form of treatment. (Indeed, one
of the costliest incidents of moral hazard against which the insurance fund must be
protected is the powerful impulse to "do everything possible" whenever near-certain
tragedy impends.) Other potential hardships might be rectified to some extent by
charity. See supra note 8. The unanswered question is the extent to which occasional
hardships would be accepted as a fact of life in a world of limited resources.
120 Conference on American Health Policy: Critical Issues for Reform, sponsored
by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C.,
Oct. 3-4, 1991; see also HENRY J. AARON, SERIOUS AND UNSTABLE CONDITION:
FINANCING AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE 27-37 (1991).
121 See supra note 2.
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the market for private health coverage, it could be observed,
optimistically, that the glass is far from empty-indeed it is probably
half full.
On the other hand, to any true-believing economist categorically
denying Aaron's hypothesis, it must be pointed out, pessimistically,
that the choice glass is half empty. The ultimate issue is not the
present state of affairs, however, but whether the choice glass is
inevitably no more than half full-because, if the market cannot give
consumers a rather full measure of meaningful choice, the nation
might as well opt for a single government payer and be done with
it.122 At the moment, it is quite likely that, as Aaron implies,
purchasers of health care could make more effective and satisfying
economizing choices through the political process than they can
make on their own in the market they face. Specifically, they are
denied de facto-and to a lesser extent de jure-the chance to make
many economizing choices that would, for many, be highly rational
in light of the very high cost and often limited benefit of much
state-of-the-art medical care.
This Article has identified a largely unrecognized but crucial
reason why consumer choice has not been a helpful force for
rationalizing private spending on health care in the United States.
Although analysts frequently blame the market's dysfunction on tax
subsidies that encourage overinsurance 123 and on cost-escalating
regulatory requirements imposed on financing plans, 124 the
inutility of private contracts in specifying health care bargains is a
far more fundamental and less obviously correctable cause of the
market's inability to solve cost problems. The thesis advanced here
is that, before giving up on the market and turning crucial decisions
over to government, a concerted effort should be made to see
122 This thesis was advanced rather aggressively in Havighurst, Why Preserve Private
Financing?, supra note 4, but only as a tour de force to inspire firms engaged in
private health care financing to challenge the dominant paradigms of medical care
and the practical and legal barriers to innovative contracts in order that they could
finally offer consumers a full range of economizing choices.
123 See supra note 9.
124 On forms of insurance regulation raising the cost of traditional coverage, see
Gail A. Jensen, Regulating the Content of Health Plans: A Review of the Evidence, in
AMERICAN HEALTH POLICY, supra note 4, and Robert S. McDonough, Note, ERISA
Preemption of State Mandated-Provider Laws, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1194. There is currently
great interest in creating limited legislative exemptions from such regulatory
*requirements as a way of making low-cost health insurance packages available to small
businesses. This Article proposes using private contract to open up further avenues
of escape from legal impediments to intelligent economizing.
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whether private contracts can become effective vehicles for
implementing private choices. Certain legislative reforms prerequi-
site to such an effort are currently under serious consideration.
Such reforms include changes in the way government subsidizes
private purchases of health coverage, federal preemption of certain
forms of state insurance regulation, and new regulation designed to
increase the security that health insurance provides (by drastically
limiting the conditions under which coverage may be terminated).
Malpractice reform is also being viewed as a possible target of the
reform effort. The usual proposals, however, do not come close to
addressing tort law's cost-escalating regulatory features. The most
practical way to change malpractice law's costly standard of care is
to facilitate its modification in private contracts specifying consumer
choices.
125
Although a wave of contractual reform could conceivably begin
in the private sector as a spontaneous response to the increasing
need to make trade-offs with respect to health care, a high-level
public effort to encourage choice-driven reforms might be necessary
to get the first olives out of the bottle. Ideally, this effort would
take the form of a presidential commission charged with educating
the public to the existence of promising economizing opportunities
in purchasing health care, the methods by which these opportunities
might be seized, and the legal and other barriers that currently
block promising initiatives. Although legislative reform would be
one object, the primary goal of this commission should be to
legitimize economizing innovations in the private sector and to
break down the interconnected practical, legal, and cultural
obstacles to private choice that have been identified in this Article.
This initiative to focus more attention on how to get value for
money in health care might be modeled on an earlier such commis-
sion that addressed ethical issues in medicine. 126 It might appro-
priately be called the President's Commission on Effectiveness and
Efficiency in Health Care.
127
125 The only federal malpractice reform bill expressly adopting this strategy is the
Domenici bill, supra note 96.
126 The earlier presidential commission is cited supra notes 11 & 80.
127 In a classic book, EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY: RANDOM REFLECTIONS ON
HEALTH SERVICES (1971), A. L. Cochrane eloquently proposed that the British
National Health Service employ outcomes and effectiveness research to establish
spending priorities. It would be fitting if the effort to bring similar insights to bear
on the private and public purchasing of health care in the United States bore a similar
title.
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Many challenges would face any educational effort to encourage
the use of private contracts to memorialize the preferences of
consumers for the purpose of forcibly communicating them to
health care providers through the medium of health care financing
plans. The seeming impracticality of specifying the obligations of
providers and payers in writing is what originally occasioned
widespread reliance on professional standards to define patient
entitlements and resolve disputes. Even though professional
standards were originally turned to only out of practical necessity,
the convention of relying on them is now reflected, if not securely
fixed, in law. Moreover, the policy of letting the medical profession
set standards for society is generally accepted; not only is the
profession itself generally trusted, but because of the large compo-
nents of science and professional judgment in clinical decisions,
there is little awareness that standards could be set in any other way.
Finally, the professional paradigm has become so deeply entrenched
that consumers now perceive health care as an entitlement rather
than as a consumer good to be purchased only to the extent
affordable.
Despite the substantial obstacles to making medical care an
object of cost-conscious consumer choice, the nation sorely needs
alternative sources of standards to govern care in various circum-
stances. Indeed, the full economic cost of deferring to nonaccount-
able physicians has now finally appeared. Indeed, the current,
nearly unbearable cost of health care is the inevitable result of
giving physicians, hospitals, and technology suppliers nearly a
generation (since the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid) in
which to invent and sell ever more costly goods and services in a
market lacking significant price sensitivity. Precisely because the
cost of looking solely to professional sources for standards is now
so high, even daunting practical, legal, and cultural obstacles to the
discovery and implementation of alternative standards ought not to
deter the needed effort. What is needed most is a major intellectual
effort to put aside conventional ways of thinking about medical care
so that it can be approached, at the margin, as a consumer good as
to which economizing is not only desirable but inevitable.
It would be extremely helpful in advancing the needed rethink-
ing of medical care if private agreements for health care financing
could be conceptualized and implemented as contracts of prospec-
tive self-denial-that is, as instruments by which persons pooling
resources to meet future health care needs agree mutually to limit
their future claims against the common fund. Because radical
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public health reform is likely to be stymied for the foreseeable
future by severe gridlock in the. political process, there is an
immediate need to improve the market's ability to control cost and
to offer affordable options to those currently without any coverage
at all. This can only be done by letting consumers (and public
health care programs as well) exercise more control over what they
spend. Health care contracts should be viewed as promising tools
for achieving this goal. If society can find the will and the skills
needed to use these tools well, it should be possible by private
action to end the medical profession's dominance and to restore to
consumers their customary sovereignty-their right to write their
own tickets in buying health care services.
